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LECTURE
1. INTRODUCTION
It is an enormous honor to be invited to deliver the Grotius lecture
and to be given the opportunity to address all of you today. I would
like to thank the Washington College of Law, especially Professor
Daniel Bradlow and Dean Claudio Grossman, and the American
Society of International Law for granting me this great honor. It is
also a particular pleasure and privilege for me because my friend
Nathaniel Berman and my teacher and mentor Judge Christopher
Weeramantry were the speakers at the inaugural Grotius lecture
delivered at the American Society of International Law in 1999.' I
would also like to thank Dean Anne-Marie Slaughter for being
generous enough to participate in this event, and I look forward to
her comments.
I would like to dedicate this lecture to someone who would be
usually sitting in the first few rows of the audience on this occasion. I
would like to dedicate this lecture to Tom Franck. This is the first
annual meeting to be held after his passing and we already miss him
enormously.
Two main themes are raised by the title of this lecture. First, the
theme of change in international law, and second, how we, as
lawyers, respond to change-should we lead or follow? These two
broad themes in turn raise a number of further questions. For
example, should we see change as progress, as has been the tendency
of many of the historians of international law?2 Or should we see
change as repetition, as suggested by David Kennedy, who has
powerfully argued that what is seen as renewal takes the form of
repetition.3 Further, of course, we must ask the question: change for
1. Christopher Weeramantry & Nathaniel Berman, The Grotius Lecture
Series, 14 AM. U. INT'LL. REv. 1515, 1515 (1999).
2. For a critical discussion of the importance of the idea of "progress" to the
discipline of international law, see generally THOMAS SKOUTERIS, THE NOTION OF
PROGRESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW DISCOURSE (2010); PROGRESS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Russell A. Miller & Rebecca M. Bratspies eds., 2008).
3. See generally David Kennedy, When Renewal Repeats: Thinking Against
The Box, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 335 (2000) (remarking that, historically, the
international legal field experiences renewal through the reintroduction of old
ideas, and suggesting that the development of genuinely new ideas would be
beneficial to the field).
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whom? And, given that change is inescapable, how does change
register? What type of change matters? Hilary Charlesworth argued
that international law is a discipline of crisis. If this is the case, does
international law respond only when confronted by dramatic and
immediately devastating events, such as a massive war or the tragedy
of 9/11, which are taken to signal some profound change? How then
does international law respond to problems that seem ever present:
poverty, environmental damage, the intensifying problems relating to
the migration of desperate peoples? Another obvious question posed
by the topic "Should international law lead or follow?", is what is
there to lead or follow? The answer that most quickly comes to mind,
of course, is politics, as international lawyers are preoccupied with
the issue of the relationship between international law and politics,
hence the ongoing interest in studying the field of international law
and international relations.
These are some preliminary observations, and I hope to explore
these issues by focusing on five themes: (1) Grotius; (2) generational
change in the American Society of International Law; (3) change
from President Bush to President Obama; (4) change and the rest of
the world; and finally, (5) change and Third World approaches to
international law.
2. GROTIUS, CHANGE, AND THE AMBIGUITIES OF WAR
AND PEACE
It is customary at the beginning of this lecture to make some
reference to Hugo Grotius; but on this occasion, given the theme of
this lecture; it is also extremely apt to reference Grotius given that
Grotius's career and writings provide us with such rich material for a
discussion of both leadership and change. Grotius was an
international lawyer who devoted his career to ensuring that
international law would lead and not simply follow. Grotius,
designated the founding father of our discipline, is also surely and
appropriately, the archetypal leader. In the words of Judge
Weeramantry:
4. See Hilary Charlesworth, International Law: A Discipline of Crisis, 65
MOD. L. REV. 377, 391 (2002) (asserting that international law relies on crises to
fuel its development which, in turn, merely perpetuates the status quo, and
suggesting that focusing on daily injustices would allow the entire field to
progress).
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It was an unprecedented situation that faced the newly emerging states of
Grotius's time. Detached from their traditional moorings to church,
empire, and a higher law, they were groping for new principles of conduct
and interrelationship to provide a compass for the tempestuous waters that
lay ahead.
Grotius rose to the occasion-a towering intellect with a passionate vision
of an ordered relationship among nations-a relationship based not on the
dogma of religion or the sword of conquest, but on human reason and
experience.5
Grotius was a man who, through his vision, insight, and learning
created a new theory of international law and relations that would
endure for many centuries. Every period of change and crisis seems
to demand a person whose vision compares with Grotius; as Roscoe
Pound made clear in his comments facing the international
community at the end of the First World War: "Our chief need is a
man with that combination of mastery of the existing legal materials,
philosophical vision and juristic faith which enabled the founder of
international law to set it up almost at one stroke."6
The genius of Grotius is so closely linked to the phenomenon of
profound change that the term "Grotian moment" has been coined-I
believe by Richard Falk-to refer to a situation where a monumental
change has occurred in international relations, and what is required,
as Pound suggests, is a person with Grotius's talent to identify the
character of this change and to formulate an adequate legal response
to it.7 This requires far more than the formulation of a new set of
doctrines or a comprehensive treaty regime; what it demands is
nothing less than a new jurisprudence, for only this can somehow
encompass and address the radical change suggested by the phrase
"Grotian moment."' Sovereignty, security, and the relationship
5. Weeramantry & Berman, supra note 1, at 1516.
6. Roscoe Pound, Philosophical Theory and International Law, in 1
BIBLIOTECA VISSERIANA DISSERTATIONUM IUS INTERNATIONALE ILLUSTRANTIUM
73, 90 (1923).
7. See Richard Falk, Some Thoughts on the Decline of International Law and
Future Prospects, 9 HOFSTRA L. REv. 399, 408 (1981) (describing the term
"Grotian moment" as a time when a declining world order is synthesized with a
newly emerging world order so as to successfully address modem challenges);
Pound, supra note 6, at 90 (explaining that a Grotian-like leader is necessary to
guide the international legal community through periods of immense transition).
8. For various uses of the phrase "Grotian moment," see INTERNATIONAL
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between war and peace-these are the great themes that concern our
discipline, and a "Grotian moment" occurs when novel events
compel a new conceptualization of these issues.
It is therefore no real surprise that Grotius is such a venerated
figure in our discipline. Before it was renamed, the British Institute
for International and Comparative Law was the Grotius Society.
Britain has its own Grotius lecture. In fact, Yevgeniy Primakov was
awarded the Hugo Grotius Prize in 2000 for "outstanding state and
social activity, for the creation and realization in international
relations of his doctrine of the primacy of international law and
realism." So Grotius has been continuously lauded in all these
sometimes puzzling ways, by a range of figures who themselves
were extraordinarily distinguished.
But if we are to focus on the idea of change, what is clearly
evident is the change that occurred in Grotian scholarship. He is no
longer seen as simply the intellectual founder of a new world order,
seeking to speak law to power, but as a far more ambiguous figure-
as a lawyer to the Dutch East India Company whose early work, The
Law of Prize and Booty, and in particular, a chapter in that work
which was to be the foundation of The Free Sea, presents a very
different set of ideas and concerns that focus on the issue of
expanding the power and reach of the Dutch East India Company in
its ongoing competition with Portugal in relation to trade in the East
Indies.9 Indeed, as a consequence of his influence on the
LAW: A CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 7 (Richard Falk et al. eds., 1985) (defining
the phrase "Grotian moment" as descriptive of a transition between two different
world order systems); Boutros Boutros-Ghali, A Grotian Moment, 18 FORDHAM
INT'L L. J. 1609, 1609 (1995) (suggesting that the modem international community
has reached a "Grotian moment" and that the old international system must be
replaced); Samuel K. Murumba, Grappling With A Grotian Moment: Sovereignty
and the Quest for a Normative World Order, 19 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 829, 832
(1993) ("A 'Grotian moment' is an epoch in which a confluence of circumstances
portends the birth of a new era in international law so long as a Grotius is on hand
to wrest the new order from the chaos and ambiguities of the dying one.");
GROTIAN MOMENT: THE INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIAL BLOG (Feb. 22,
2011), http://law.case.edu/saddamtrial/ (stating that the phrase "Grotian moment"
refers to a legal development that is so significant that it may create new customary
international law, or radically transform the interpretation of treaty-based law).
9. See generally HUGO GROTIUS, COMMENTARY ON THE LAW OF PRIZE AND
BooTY [1603] ch. XII (1950) (arguing that the sea must be considered public and
open to all nations and peoples, and that the Portuguese may not restrict trade
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development of Roman-Dutch law-another aspect of his genius-
Grotius is a part of the living jurisprudence of Sri Lanka, which was
partially colonized by the Dutch East India Company in the
seventeenth century. Thanks to the recent work of scholars such as
Richard Tuck,10 Peter Borschberg," Martine van Ittersum, 12 Edward
Keene," Ileana Porras,14 and Eric Wilson," we now know how this
activities by the Dutch East India Company in the East Indies).
10. See generally RICHARD TUCK, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE: POLITICAL
THOUGHT AND THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER FROM GROTIUS TO KANT 78-108
(1999) (reviewing the way in which Grotius contributed to the development of
international relations theory as it pertains to boundaries of legitimate action by
sovereign states).
11. See Peter Borschberg, The Santa Catarina Incident of 1603: Dutch
Freebooting, the Portuguese Estado da India and Intra-Asian Trade at the Dawn
of the 17th Century, REVISTA DE CULTURA, Nov. 2004, at 13, 14, available at
http://www.borschberg.sg/index files/ RCStaCatarina.pdf (positing that Grotius
likely developed much of the knowledge and many of the views that influenced
The Rights of War and Peace while studying and defending the Santa Catarina
Incident).
12. See Martine Julia van Ittersum , The Long Goodbye: Hugo Grotius'
Justification ofDutch Expansion Overseas, 1615-1645, 36 HIST. OF EUR. IDEAS
386, 391-93 (2010) [hereinafter van Ittersum, The Long Goodbye] (asserting that
Grotius's observations about third-party liability and trading monopolies in The
Rights of War and Peace suggest that his writing was influenced by his prior
experiences with the Dutch East India Company). See generally MARTINE VAN
ITTERSUM, PROFIT AND PRINCIPLE: HUGO GROTIUS, NATURAL RIGHTS THEORIES
AND THE RISE OF DUTCH POWER IN THE EAST INDIES 1595-1615 (2006) (arguing
that the rights and contract theories articulated by Grotius in The Law ofPrize and
Booty were developed to address practical issues faced by the Dutch East India
Company, and to defend and legitimize the company's actions in the East Indies).
13. See EDWARD KEENE, BEYOND THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: GROTIUS,
COLONIALISM AND ORDER IN WORLD POLITICS 40 (2002) (indicating that Grotius's
arguments that, under the law of nations, sovereign powers were transferable, and
that private individuals possessed rights over their persons and property, were used
to justify Dutch actions).
14. See Ileana M. Porras, Constructing International Law in the East Indian
Seas: Property, Sovereignty, Commerce and War in Hugo Grotius' De lure
Praedae-The Law of Prize and Booty, or "On How to Distinguish Merchants
From Pirates", 31 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 741, 742-43 (2006) (maintaining that De
lure Praedae was primarily written to justify the Dutch seizure of a Portuguese
vessel in the East Indies, and moreover, that this Grotian work contained the
foundational concepts of his later work on the rights of war and peace).
15. See generally ERIC WILSON, THE SAVAGE REPUBLIC: DE INDIS OF HUGO
GROTIUS, REPUBLICANISM, AND DUTCH HEGEMONY WITHIN THE EARLY MODERN
WORLD-SYSTEM (C. 1600-1619) xiii (2008) (utilizing a critical analysis of
Grotius's De Indis to demonstrate the utility of multiple methodologies in
scholarship regarding the genesis of the modem international legal system).
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earlier work of Grotiusl6 influenced the text that is generally
regarded as his masterwork, and that is the focus of traditional
Grotius scholarship: The Rights of War and Peace.17 The "Grotian
tradition" was powerfully shaped by the work of Sir Hersch
Lauterpacht.18 In this version, Grotius, like Sir Hersch himself, is a
heroic figure seeking to control the escalation of violence and to
reconstitute a ruined Europe. But the Grotius that emerges from
newer scholarship that explores his dealings with the Dutch East
India Company ("VOC") is a more ambitious and self-interested
figure, seeking his own advancement and writing on the themes of
war, commerce, privateering, mercenaries, and trade in a manner
clearly linked with his immediate employment. This is the Grotius
that engaged in the dual enterprise of establishing the Dutch
Republic and asserting Dutch sovereignty as an incipient trading
empire.19 Given the traditional view of Grotius as the bringer of
peace and justice to a political order driven by religious conflict, it is
also disconcerting to note that his great work, which is understood as
a blueprint for peace, is principally about war, and that war appears
to be placed under little restraint in Grotius's system. Thus, when
Gustavus Adolphus set about the conquest of Pomerania, he did so
with justification from Grotius. As the historian Peter Wilson argues
in his recent work on the Thirty Years' War, "[t]his claim (by
16. For a collection of essays reassessing Grotius's early work, see also 30
GROTIANA 1 (2009).
17. 2 HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE (Richard Tuck ed.,
Liberty Fund 2005) (1625).
18. See generally Hersch Lauterpacht, The Grotian Tradition in International
Law, 1946 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1. Interestingly, Sir Hersch himself makes the point
that a great deal of material in The Rights of War and Peace was taken from The
Law ofPrize and Booty. See id. at 4 (contending that The Rights of War and Peace
lacks fluidity because Grotius included within it material he wrote several years
before in The Law of Prize and Booty). Only in more recent times were the
implications of this borrowing examined. See, e.g., A NORMATIVE APPROACH TO
WAR: PEACE, WAR, AND JUSTICE IN HUGO GROTIUS (Onuma Yasuaki ed., 1993)
(reflecting on the significance and limitations of The Rights of War and Peace).
19. See van Ittersum, The Long Goodbye, supra note 12, at 388-89, 399-407
(describing Grotius's dedication to the Dutch East India Company and his
continuous efforts to act and write on its behalf, and explaining how Grotius's son
essentially acted as his proxy while employed at the Dutch East India Company).
See generally WILSON, supra note 15. These two works provide a detailed study of
the close and ongoing links between the VOC and Grotius. These links extended to
the point where Grotius's sons were employed by the VOC and used their father's
work to justify Dutch claims to engage in the cinnamon trade in Ceylon.
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Gustavus Adolpus) rested on Hugo Grotius's helpful recent book that
implied that the Swedes could do as they pleased provided they
treated conquered peoples humanely." 20 This aspect of Grotius's
work was recognized and commented on by Lauterpacht, even as he
gallantly attempted, with his considerable ingenuity, to salvage from
all this an image of Grotius as the author of a new, just, and peaceful
order. Thus, Lauterpacht pointed to the fact that Grotius's
preoccupation with order and stability-perhaps understandable
given the circumstances-were such that he refused to recognize the
right of people to rebel against a tyranny and he justified slavery.21
Further, as Lauterpacht notes, according to Grotius, "[c]aptives taken
in war may be killed. So can those who surrender but whose
surrender is not accepted. Water may be polluted, though not by
poison. Both by the law of nations and by the law of nature it is
permissible to use assassins."2 2 Many of these actions violate
contemporary international law norms. So a work that is supposed to
advocate peace appears instead to advocate violence of an almost
unrestrained sort. For Grotius, the suffering of an injury was the
basis of a right to go to war: "Thefirst Cause therefore of a just War,
is an Injury, which tho' not done, yet threatens our Persons or our
Estates."23 A survey of The Rights of War and Peace indicates that
Grotius permitted recourse to war in an extraordinarily broad range
of circumstances, including breach of contract. 2 4 Just war doctrine,
of course, was also especially useful to justify war against non-
European peoples who resisted the expanding European trading
20. PETER H. WILSON, THE THIRTY YEARS WAR: EUROPE'S TRAGEDY 463
(2009).
21. Lauterpacht, supra note 18, at 43-44.
22. Id. at 12 (internal footnotes omitted in cited material).
23. GROTIUS, supra note 17, ch. I, 11.3. This passage seems to approve what
we might now called preemptive action. However, Grotius seems to qualify his
position later when he states: "But I can by no Means approve of what some
Authors have advanced, that by the Law of Nations it is permitted to take up Arms
to reduce the growing Power of a Prince or State, which if too much augmented,
may possibly injure us." Id. XVII. He continues saying: "but to pretend to have a
Right to injure another, merely from a Possibility that he may injure me, is
repugnant to all the Justice in the World: For such is the Condition of the present
Life, that we can never be in perfect Security." Id.
24. As Lauterpacht points out, however, it is not always clear what Grotius'
position was after he cites innumerable authorities. See Lauterpacht, supra note 18,
at 3-4 (attributing the disjointed nature of The Rights of War and Peace to
Grotius's reliance on a myriad of sources).
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Empires.25
Actually reading The Rights of War and Peace, battling through
all the difficult and distracting text, its invocation of religion and
scripture, and historical and classical precedents, one is struck by
how much violence inhabits and permeates that text, which is yet
supposedly intent on establishing peace and restraining force. But
perhaps this is inevitably the case. Any system that appeared to
outlaw war could seem naive and utopian, and Grotius certainly
would not want to be seen in such terms. It is hardly surprising then
that Grotius, together with Vattel and Puffendorf, was dismissed by
Kant as being one of the "sorry comforters" who justify violence.26
If the great text that is regarded as the foundation of our discipline,
and that is understood as restraining the recourse to war and limiting
the use of force, is indeed more ambiguous and can be read instead
as somehow legitimizing, if not enabling, violence, then crucial
questions arise as to whether international law adapted and
developed to overcome these deficiencies and inadequacies. Or
perhaps violence is an inextricable aspect of international law, and
Grotius was simply reconstituting this relationship and providing it
with a different intellectual foundation.
It is clearly the case that war has taken different forms over the
centuries. 27 And yet, the relationship between war and peace, the
seeming inescapability, if not pre-eminence of war, so problematic in
Grotius's time, is no less complex in our own.2 1 President Obama's
speech on the occasion of being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize
could very accurately, I believe, be termed precisely The Rights of
War and Peace. Indeed, President Obama invites the comparison
when he asserts that he is "filled with difficult questions about the
relationship between war and peace, and our effort to replace one
25. See, e.g., TUCK, supra note 10, at 67.
26. IMMANUEL KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE: A PHILOSOPHICAL SKETCH (1795),
reprinted in KANT: POLITICAL WRITINGS 103 (Hans Reiss ed., H.B. Nisbet trans.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 2d ed. 1991).
27. See generally STEPHEN C. NEFF, WAR AND THE LAW OF NATIONS: A
GENERAL HISTORY (2005) (reviewing the past several centuries of warfare,
including religious and philosophical views of war and "just war" theories).
28. See generally DAVID KENNEDY, OF WAR AND LAW (2006) (illustrating the
perplexities and challenges arising from the intersection of war, peace, and law that
confront the modem international community).
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with the other."29 Although ostensibly a speech about peace-the
title of the Nobel Prize he was awarded-President Obama's speech
makes it clear that war is sometimes necessary. Thus, the teachings
of Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr., the great champions of non-
violence, may not always be applicable. In asserting that "[w]e will
not eradicate violent conflict in our lifetimes," and that we "will find
the use of force not only necessary but morally justified," President
Obama acknowledged that he was departing from the words and
example of one of his inspirations, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., who,
in his own Nobel prize ceremony, stated that "[v]iolence never
brings permanent peace. It solves no social problem: it merely
creates new and more complicated ones."30
Violence has its uses. Further, civilian casualties are inevitable,
even in the most just war. President Obama asserts that one of the
conditions of a 'just war " is satisfied "if, whenever possible,
civilians are spared from violence."3 1 The implication appears to be
that the necessities of war prevail, and that civilians are to be spared
only when the military imperatives permit this. The sad inevitability
of civilian deaths in the cause of a greater good is emphasized by
President Obama again when he asserts that, even in the most just
war, civilian casualties are massive: "And while it's hard to conceive
of a cause more just than the defeat of the Third Reich and the Axis
powers, World War II was a conflict in which the total number of
civilians who died exceeded the number of soldiers who perished."32
The general view emerging from President Obama's speech is that
war is, if not in some ways interchangeable with peace, then at least
essential for peace. This of course is a very traditional argument, the
goal of war is the achievement of peace. But adopting such a view
29. Barack Obama, President of the United States of America, Remarks by the
President at the Acceptance of the Nobel Peace Prize (Dec. 10, 2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/ remarks-president-acceptance-nobel-
peace-prize.
30. Id. (citing Martin Luther King, Jr., Nobel Lecture: The Quest for Peace and
Justice (Dec. 11, 1964), available at http://nobelprize.org/nobelprizes/peace/
laureates/1 964/king-lecture.html).
3 1. Id.
32. Id.; see also Chris af Jochnick & Roger Normand, The Legitimation of
Violence: A Critical History of the Laws of War, 35 HARv. INT'L L.J. 49, 50-51
(1994) (asserting that instead of humanizing war, the laws of war actually enable
and further legitimize wartime violence).
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places very heavy emphasis on distinguishing between just and
unjust wars, and President Obama both recognizes and extends this
line of thinking to the end of war; he urges us to "think in new ways
about the notions of just war and the imperatives of a just peace.""
The question may then arise as to whether a "just peace" can in some
way remedy an otherwise unjust war. To revert to the framework of
Grotius, the question then might be whether conquest is permitted if
it results in the humane treatment of the subjected peoples. This was
certainly the view taken by colonial powers for many centuries.
The unavoidable, necessary, and even useful aspect of war in
relation to the achievement of peace appears to be recognized by the
Nobel Prize committee itself. Gandhi, of course, was never awarded
the Nobel Peace Prize-an enduring scandal. Rather, it is notable
that many of the recipients of this prize proved themselves earlier to
be extremely adept at the waging of war. This is also evident in the
award of the prize to the founding President of our own Society,
Elihu Root. Root won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1912 for his
sustained efforts to promote the resolution of international disputes
through judicial mechanisms, rather than by resort to war.3 4 Root's
dedicated work on this still compelling project resulted, for instance,
in the creation of the Permanent Court of International Justice.
Nevertheless, even as he attempted in this way to promote peace, he
intimately and actively engaged in the prosecution of a ruthless war
against the insurgents of the Philippines. The war arose after the
United States defeated the Spanish in the Philippines, one
consequence of the war between the United States and Spain that
began in 1898. Presenting itself initially as a liberator of the Filipino
people, the United States then found itself at war against a new
enemy, the Filipino nationalists. The subsequent guerrilla war lasted
for several years. Thousands of Filipinos were killed and many
atrocities were committed by American troops in their battle against
the "insurgents," prompting inquiries by various commissions. Root
was one of the principal architects of the American war in the
33. Obama, supra note 29.
34. Elihu Root - Biography, NOBEL PRIZE.ORG, http://www.nobelprize.org/
nobel prizes/peace/laureates/1912/root-bio.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2011)
(describing Root's participation in creating international dispute bodies, including
the Central American Court of Justice, the World Court, and a Permanent Court of
International Justice).
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Philippines. One of his major early works is titled, precisely, Military
and Colonial Policy of the United States: Addresses and Reports.
There he elaborates on themes, outlined in chapter headings, such as
"The Suppression of Insurrection and the Building-up of Civil
Government;" "Military Operations in the Islands;" "Continued
Military Operations in the Philippines;" and "The Beginnings of
Civil Government." 3 6
Root basically adopted a two-fold strategy to deal with the
challenge of creating a civilian government. First, the United States
sought to win over the Filipino population and assure them of the
good intentions of the United States by establishing local
governments, and placing suitable Filipinos into the structure of that
government. It had to be ensured, in the stern words of Root, that any
such Filipinos must show "absolute and unconditional loyalty "to the
United States. Secondly, it was recognized that certain tribes would
not be amenable to the ministrations and benefits of civilization. In
dealing with this situation, Root drew on America's own experience
with the Native Americans:
In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the islands the Commission
should adopt the same course followed by Congress in permitting the
tribes of our North American Indians to maintain their tribal organization
and government, and under which many of those tribes are now living in
peace and contentment, surrounded by a civilization to which they are
unable or unwilling to conform. Such tribal governments should,
however, be subjected to wise and firm regulation, and without undue or
petty interference constant and active effort should be exercised to
prevent barbarous practices and introduce civilized customs.3 8
Ideally then, tribal rule and the advancement of civilization were
to be reconciled in this way. The proper intentions of the United
States, and what distinguished them from the egregious European
35. ELIHfu ROOT, THE MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY OF THE UNITED
STATES: ADDRESSES AND REPORTS (Robert Bacon & James Brown Scott eds.,
1916).
3 6. Id.
37. See Letter from William McKinley, Secretary of War, to Bd. of Comm'rs
to the Philippine Islands, in ROOT, supra note 35, at 291 (requiring that the central
authority in the islands maintain the absolute power to remove and punish any
native given a position of public office who failed to exhibit "unconditional
loyalty" to the United States).
38. ROOT, supra note 35, at 321.
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colonial powers, were manifest in the fact that even as it inflicted this
massive violence on the Philippines, the United States also extended
many of the rights contained in the United States Bill of Rights to the
Philippines. We return here to the Grotian argument that force and
conquest could be justified if it resulted in the creation of a more
humane society. Root, in addition, argued that the military action in
the Philippines was not a conquest because it was directed towards
preparing the Filipinos for self-government. Mark Twain, however,
was not persuaded by any of these arguments. He was emphatically
and vocally opposed to the war, and was a prominent member of the
American Anti-Imperial league.3 9 His antipathy to imperialism was
directed earlier at the excesses committed by King Leopold in the
Congo.
It would be, of course, interesting to compare Root's strategies
with those deployed by the United States in other wars with
insurgents in countries where the United States professed itself to be
intent on liberating a hapless population from all manner of tyranny
and medieval barbarity. Root was, from 1899 to 1904, the U.S.
Secretary of War. There was no ambiguity about the duties of the
holder of this office. The fact that the title of this office was changed
to "Secretary of Defense," as it currently reads, is a product, perhaps,
not so much of a change in outlook, as a reflection on the
interchangeable and ambivalent nature of the relationship between
war and defense, and war and peace.40 Further, Root, like Grotius, is
something of a heroic figure. His extraordinary career extended for
many decades; 41 and yet, like Grotius, he was a more complex figure
than much of the literature about him would suggest. Root's
commitment to the work of peace combined with highly developed
39. See generally MARK TWAIN'S WEAPONS OF SATIRE: ANTI-IMPERIALIST
WRITINGS ON THE PHILIPPINE-AMERICAN WAR (Jim Zwick ed., 1992).
40. This interchangeable nature of the relationship between war and peace
permeates President Obama's Nobel Peace prize speech as well. Thus, when
referring to the soldiers of NATO and other U.S. allies, he states: "That's why we
honor those who return home from peacekeeping and training abroad to Oslo and
Rome; to Ottawa and Sydney; to Dhaka and Kigali-we honor them not as makers
of war, but of wagers-but as wagers of peace." Obama, supra note 29.
41. See generally PHILIP C. JESSUP, 1 ELIHU ROOT (1938) (documenting Root's
life and career, from his early legal career, through his service in the cabinets of
President McKinley and President Theodore Roosevelt, to his receipt of the Nobel
Peace Prize in 1912).
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skills of war and, his humanitarianism was intimately connected with
an outlook that was, in the end, imperial. In this respect, he was no
different from many of the prominent international lawyers of the
late nineteenth century who were closely connected with the
imperial, and inherently violent, enterprise.42 The dual stature of war
and peace and the people who decide these issues, is suggested by
President Obama at the outset of his speech. He is the recipient of the
Nobel Peace Prize but he is also the Commander in Chief of a nation
that is at war in several countries. But, if it is accepted that war is a
means to peace, then there is no necessary contradiction, and it may
even be the case that a Commander in Chief is especially qualified to
win a Nobel Peace Prize. The Grotian ambiguities inescapably
remain with us.
3. GENERATIONAL CHANGE
Only change is permanent, as it were. And I look forward to
hearing the different panels on whether, in particular areas of law,
this is somehow an especially dramatic time of change, as suggested
by the fact that this conference is based on this idea. But there is one
change that affects us all no matter what area we specialize in. With
the passing of Tom Franck and Ian Brownlie, a sense that
generational change is now upon us is now somewhat palpable.
It is, of course, impossible to generalize about an entire
generation, and there is a particular difficulty in speaking about
people who are known so well to all of you. I would simply suggest
that each of them, provided, in different ways, models of international
lawyers who were leaders, and who were powerfully committed to
the idea that international law should lead rather than follow. In this
case, leading meant upholding international law, and being
committed to international law and the expansion of international
42. See generally MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS:
THE RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870-1960 (2001) (arguing that the
legal profession was "depoliticized," while simultaneously infused with an
imperialist objective); Fr6deric Migret, From 'Savages' to 'Unlawful
Combatants': A Postcolonial Look at International Humanitarian Law's 'Other',
in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ITS OTHERS 265, 265-317 (Anne Orford ed., 2006)
(explaining that while international humanitarian law presumably assumes the
inclusion of all, from the time of its emergence, it has excluded the colonial
"other" from its protection).
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law. In different ways, Tom and Ian Brownlie contributed immensely
to this tradition.
Tom, in The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations,43 sought to
answer one of the oldest questions that we as international lawyers
confront: why should we regard international law as binding? He
brought to this question a particularly American sensibility - one that
attempted to incorporate the political into a legal framework. As
Tom demonstrated so brilliantly in his work, the concept of
legitimacy acts as an effective bridge between the spheres of the
legal and the political to provide a very persuasive answer to a
question that has preoccupied our discipline.4 The notion of the
binding quality of international law was so important to Tom that he
returned to this theme in the essay he wrote on the occasion of the
one-hundredth anniversary of the publication of the American
Journal of International Law.4 5
In his other very influential work on democratic governance, Tom
engaged in a quintessentially Grotian exercise. 46 He acknowledged
the dramatic turn to democracy that was taking place in Eastern
Europe and other parts of the world after the end of the Cold War,
and sought to give these political developments a legal expression-
a legal form; hence his argument for an evolving right to democratic
43. THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS
(1990). Like Grotius, Tom was deeply knowledgeable about many colonial issues
and wrote his first book on the topic of "Race and Nationalism." See Karen Knop,
Reflections on Thomas Franck, Race and Nationalism (1960): 'General Principles
ofLaw' and Situated Generality, 35 NYU J. INT'L L. & POL. 437 (2003).
44. See generally id. (emphasizing that questions regarding the binding or
consensual nature of laws are most often directed towards international, versus
domestic, law).
45. See generally Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy and the
Legitimacy of Power: International Law in an Age of Power Disequilibrium, 100
AM. J. INT'L L. 88 (2006) (noting the evolution in the views of American
international law professors and practitioners from the belief that international law
would triumph over nationalism and promote a cooperative approach for resolving
international issues, to the contemporary sense that international law is merely one
of many avenues for advancing the national interest).
46. See generally Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic
Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 46 (1992) (asserting that there has been an
emergence of an entitlement to democratic governance through the development of
entitlements to self-determination, free expression as a human right, and
participatory elections).
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government.4 7 For Tom, then, politics always affected the formation
of the law, and yet, the law had its own independent reality which
would in turn shape the character of politics.
I always saw Sir Ian Brownlie as a brilliant embodiment of the
positivist tradition. He begins his classic text, Principles of Public
International Law,48 in the most uncompromising way: not with the
issue of whether "international law really is law"-a topic that many
American textbooks, somewhat defensively, discuss in their very
first chapters, but rather Sir Ian (I could never bring myself to call
him "Ian," although he invited me to do so) simply begins with the
sources of international law.4 9 International law is law and we simply
proceed from that point onwards to understand the elements of
international law and how they are applied. He was possibly
controversial, but he was also something of a hero to me as he argued
so many cases that might be regarded as unpopular. He was on the
"other side" in Nicaragua,s0 in Nauru," and in the Lockerbie5 2 and
NATO cases." He always projected the belief that the price of
adhering to the rule of law is to accept its operation, even in the most
difficult and complicated circumstances, and even in the midst of
ongoing armed conflict. To Sir Ian, it seemed, the rule of law either
existed or it did not exist. It is unsurprising that his Hague lectures,
given in the year of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations, are
47. See, e.g., id. at 90-91 (recognizing that there exists an evolving entitlement
to democratic governance, but also warning of "residual problems" inherent in
democracies).
48. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (6th ed.
2003).
49. Id. at 3-4 (indicating that "the sources of international law and the law of
treaties . . . must be regarded as fundamental: between them they provide the basic
particles of the legal regime").
50. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
51. Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.), Preliminary
Objections, 1992 I.C.J. 240 (June 26).
52. Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal
Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.K.),
Preliminary Objections, 1998 I.C.J. 9 (Feb. 27); Questions of Interpretation and
Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at
Lockerbie (Libya v. U.S.), Preliminary Objections, 1998 I.C.J. 115 (Feb. 27).
53. See, e.g., Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Belg., Can., Fr., Ger., It.,
Neth., Port., Spain, U.K., U.S.), 1999 I.C.J. 124 (June 2).
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entitled The Rule of Law in International Affairs.54
There is another member of this generation that I would like to
mention in terms of the whole theme of international lawyers as
leaders or followers, and that is Professor Abe Chayes, a major
figure of that generation whom I was privileged to know. Abe, of
course, was Legal Advisor to the United States. He often told the
story about himself, of how at his confirmation hearing, he advocated
the greater use of the ICJ ("International Court of Justice") by the
United States. When asked how many judges sat on the International
Court, he was unable to answer! In an opinion he gave in 1961,
Professor Chayes advised on General Maxwell Taylor's
recommendation that more troops should be deployed in South
Vietnam." While providing legal advice that generally authorized the
proposed action, Professor Chayes proceeded to articulate, because
of his "deep concern with these matters," a less technical approach to
the issues raised:
The central feature of the course would be the initial introduction of
substantial numbers of United States troops to help in pacifying the
country ... In assessing the prospects for this course the long history of
attempts to prop up unpopular governments through the use of foreign
military forces is powerfully discouraging ... In my view, a more
promising course of action would be to seek to internationalize the
problem with a view to a negotiated settlement or a United Nations
solution. 56
For Abe, then, international law and the U.N. system were
powerful instruments that guided his approach to international
relations, and he was very astute in understanding the relationship
between legal and political approaches to a particular issue. His acute
understanding of the relationship between law and politics was also
powerfully demonstrated by his approach to the Cuban missile crisis,
54. IAN BROWNLIE, THE RULE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS:
INTERNATIONAL LAW AT THE FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE UNITED NATIONS
(1998).
55. See Memorandum From the Legal Adviser (Chayes) to the Secretary of
State (Nov. 16, 1961), available at www.state.gov/www/aboutstate/
history/vol_il1961/y.html (advising that proposed U.S. actions in Vietnam from
the 1961 report by U.S. General Taylor largely posed no insurmountable legal
problems, but advocating that a United Nations or international negotiated solution
would be more promising).
5 6. Id.
2011] 1331
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
which contributed to the successful resolution of what was surely one
of the most dangerous crises ever to confront the international
community.57 His own commitment to the idea of the international
rule of law was most dramatically demonstrated, perhaps, in his
decision to appear with Sir Ian for Nicaragua against the United
States. For him, it seemed, the rule of law applied even when, indeed
particularly when, it acted against his own country. I think, further,
that Harold Koh, now following in his teacher's footsteps as Legal
Advisor, pointed to another aspect of Professor Chayes' legacy in his
eulogy:
He had taught me, more fundamentally, what it means to be a lawyer
committed to the rule of law in international affairs. For if international
relations are to be more than just power politics, Abe showed us,
international lawyers must be moral actors. Our job is not simply to do as
we are told. We must fuse our training and skill with moral courage, and
guide the evolution of legal process with the application of fundamental
values.58
Apart from providing us with insight into Abe's concern for the
rule of law in international affairs, Dean Koh very importantly
stressed the role played by international lawyers in upholding the
international rule of law. International law then is not in itself some
neutral instrument that is simply applied to a situation. Rather,
international law is given its force and its efficacy through the
agents, the international lawyers that use and develop and elaborate
it. The topic of this lecture could then be rephrased as "Should
international lawyers lead or follow?" And of course, the question is
what leadership means, in this context. The Chilcot inquiry that is
now unfolding in the United Kingdom has heard from a number of
very distinguished and senior international lawyers in relation to
legal issues surrounding the decision to invade Iraq." And these
57. See generally ABRAM CHAYES, THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS:
INTERNATIONAL CRISES AND THE ROLE OF LAW (1974) (drawing from his
experience as a Legal Advisor in the U.S. Department of State to conclude that
during the Cuban Missile Crisis international law provided a structure through
which the United States made and legitimized its decisions).
58. Harold Hongju Koh, An Uncommon Lawyer, 42 HARv. INT'L L. J. 7, 9
(2001).
59. See generally About the Inquiry, THE IRAQ INQUIRY,
http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/about.aspx (last visited Oct. 1, 2011) (identifying
that the Chilcot Inquiry was launched officially on July 30, 2009, and generally
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lawyers provide very different models of what leadership might
suggest.
So when we survey this generation, and this attempt is only
cursory, needless to say, I do think that we have fine examples of
international lawyers as leaders in the form of people like Tom, Sir
Ian, and Abe Chayes. The younger generation, my own generation,
might see itself as being more sophisticated, more sensitive to the
nuances of the relationship between law and politics, more
methodologically advanced, more formidably multidisciplinary, and
more sophisticated in its understanding of power and less inhibited in
using it.60 But, and I could be succumbing to clich6 and
sentimentality here, my view is that we still have something very
important to learn from the older generation. I think they understood
only too well that law is inevitably affected by politics, that states
may be driven by their interests. This idea recently enjoyed a
powerful revival, but was eloquently stated almost two centuries ago
by Jeremy Bentham.
I think Tom, Sir Ian, and Abe, understood this argument very well
when they confronted the great crises of their time. But I think they
took the long view of international law and politics, and appreciated
the point that international law, whatever its weaknesses, proved
over the centuries and through great turbulence and dislocation, to be
extraordinarily resilient. Their approach, which might be regarded as
the traditional approach, has returned once more. As President
Obama makes clear in his Nobel Prize speech: "Nevertheless, I am
convinced that adhering to standards, international standards,
describing the purpose of the inquiry as to unearth lessons that can be taken away
from the Iraq conflict).
60. For example, the memoranda authored by John Yoo have been extensively
analyzed and criticized. One of the features of his memoranda that I find most
interesting is the dismissive, triumphal, and even contemptuous tone that Professor
Yoo adopts in his repudiation of the views of two very experienced and
distinguished individuals: Colin Powell and the then-legal adviser, William
Howard Taft. See Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Asst. Attorney Gen., to
William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep't of Def. 1-2, 81 (Mar. 14, 2003),
available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/safefree/yooarmytorturememo.pdf
(concluding that alien enemy combatants held abroad are not protected by the Fifth
and Eighth Amendments, that generally applicable criminal laws do not apply to
the military interrogation of these combatants, and that the United States has no
obligations regarding the conduct of interrogations under international law beyond
its obligations under U.S. law).
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strengthens those who do, and isolates and weakens those who
don't."6 1 President Obama also states: "Furthermore, America-in
fact, no nation-can insist that others follow the rules of the road if
we refuse to follow them ourselves." 6 2 Perhaps, even the second
Bush administration realized that the United States, for all its power,
could not isolate itself from the international community and
international law.
4. SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: WHERE
ARE WE NOW, WHAT CHANGES HAVE OCCURRED?
The change that occurred in U.S. foreign policy from the Bush
administration to the Obama administration is an issue that will be
extensively explored in the course of this conference. Whether
consciously or otherwise, the Bush administration treated 9/11 as
what we might term a "Grotian moment" -one in which the entire
character of the international system changed irrevocably. As a
consequence, the old system of international law and relations
appeared inadequate, to many, to deal with these unprecedented
challenges. The Bush administration responded by unilaterally
amending fundamental aspects relating to various areas of law,
including the law of war and international human rights law. The
Bush doctrine of "preemptive self-defense" was one of the most
prominent examples of this radical attempt to revise long established
principles of international law. As the then Secretary-General of the
United Nations, Kofi Annan asserted, the Bush doctrine would have
greatly altered, if not undermined, the foundations of the U.N.
approach to the use of force. The Bush administration generally
argued that it was acting within a new legal framework, one that was
appropriate for the harsh new international realities that emerged
from 9/11. The United States itself was the author and legislator, of
this new system; a system that was revealed unmistakably to favor
and legitimize the United States and its own practices and policies,
some of which would have been clearly illegal under established
international law. As Detlev Vagts remarked, it suits the hegemon to
act within the law, suitably amended. 63 The Bush administration's
61. Obama, supra note 29.
62. Id.
63. Detlev F. Vagts, Hegemonic International Law, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 843, 845
(2001) ("[I1t can be convenient for the hegemon to have a body of law to work
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response to 9/11 suggests how the trope of the "Grotian moment"
might be used by a hegemonic power rather than a visionary jurist.
It is clear that President Obama, through his affirmation of the
importance of international law, seeks to distance himself from the
Bush administration's position. He is particularly forceful in
affirming the application of international humanitarian law in
America's fight against terror:
And even as we confront a vicious adversary that abides by no rules, I
believe the United States of America must remain a standard bearer in the
conduct of war. That is what makes us different from those whom we
fight. That is a source of our strength. That is why I prohibited torture.
That is why I ordered the prison at Guantanamo Bay closed.64
Despite these contrasts, one respect in which President Obama and
President Bush may share a certain commonality is in their view that
democratic sovereignty is somehow distinctive and that international
law should recognize this in some way.
The allegedly unique character of democratic sovereignty can be
placed within a more general context of an ongoing debate about the
contemporary status of sovereignty. My broad argument here is that,
in recent times, while there have been major developments in
undermining, disaggregating, dividing, or sharing sovereignty, and
while these developments will have a continuing effect, what we
might be witnessing is a return to more classical ideas of formal
sovereignty. In examining these themes I will focus on the
relationship between democracy and international law-a theme that
President Obama alludes to in his Nobel Prize speech; the idea that
democratic sovereignty is distinctive. This idea was developed by
international relations scholars and political scientists who studied
extensively the thesis that democratic states do not go to war with
each other. The Bush administration, in its two National Security
Strategies, also focused on the significance of democracy. Can we
trace a shift between these positions? What does that suggest? How
should we see these developments in the broader context of
international law and sovereignty?
The classic idea that ostensibly was established by the Peace of
with, provided that it is suitably adapted.").
64. Obama, supra note 29.
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Westphalia was that a sovereign has absolute power within its own
territory. Recent studies of the Peace of Westpahalia, and indeed,
even some classic, older studies, have suggested that this view of
Westphalian sovereignty is badly mistaken.6 5 Nevertheless, the idea
of an all-powerful sovereign exercised an enduring influence on the
thinking of peoples and states. In recent times, globalization, the
expansion of international human rights law, and the formulation of
new principles, such as the responsibility to protect, have all, in
different ways, undermined the idea of classical Westphalian
sovereignty.
Tom Franck, as already mentioned, drew attention to the
emergence of democratic government, and this was part of a much
broader and ambitious attempt to understand the distinctive character
of democratic sovereignty and its significance for international law
and relations. In the field of international law, states, regional
organizations, and international human rights institutions were all
attempting to promote democracy. Democracy of course is an end in
itself, but in the 1990s, democracy was also linked to various other
areas of international concern, such as development, and it was
argued that democracy was in some way essential for development.
The traditional position of international law is that a sovereign
state has the right to adopt any form of government, whether a
democracy or dictatorship. The character of this government does not
legally affect or diminish in any way the sovereignty of a state. The
growing power of democratic sovereignty, however, was suggested
by the fact that in different ways, the idea was promoted that only
democratic states were properly sovereign. Thus, for instance, the
Badinter Commission applied a set of criteria that must be satisfied
by any entity seeking to win the recognition of the European
Community as a state. Among the criteria was democratic
governance.66 Further, democracy was posited as being of such
importance that its maintenance and promotion could prevail even
65. See STEPHANE BEAULAC, THE POWER OF LANGUAGE IN THE MAKING OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE WORD SOVEREIGNTY IN BODIN AND VATTEL AND THE
MYTH OF WESTPHALIA 91-97 (2004) (refuting the notion that the Peace of
Westphalia gave rise to the idea of state sovereignty as "historically unfounded"
and "a myth").
66. Declaration on Yugoslavia and on The Guidelines on the Recognition of
New States, Dec.16, 1991, 31 I.L.M. 1485, 1486-87 (1992).
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against well-established principles of international law, such as the
principle of non-intervention.
The Security Council authorized intervention in Haiti to challenge
a government that came to power by displacing a democratically
elected government led by President Aristide. 67 This emphasis on
democracy was not in any way a purely Western phenomenon. The
African Union intervened in a number of cases, without Security
Council authorization or any suggestion of self-defense, in an
attempt to restore democratic regimes. Latin American countries
were equally insistent on the importance of democratic governance.
Inevitably, a number of arguments were made to the effect that the
international system had reached a point where democratic
intervention was permissible.
In the field of international relations, democratic sovereignty was
attracting a great deal of study. In his famously influential essay,
Perpetual Peace, Immanuel Kant argued that states with republican
governments did not go to war with each other. 68 Kant was opposed
to the idea of a world government being necessary for the
establishing of peace.69 Kant viewed such a government as
undesirable and unworkable for many reasons, not least the
propensity of such a government to become dictatorial and far
removed from the people that were its subjects. Instead, Kant argued,
a world comprised of states that were governed internally by
republican constitutions, would result in a stable and peaceful
system." Kant's theory was based on his view that the internal
67. The subsequent history of this regime and of governance in Haiti in general
is both ironic and tragic. See generally China Mi6ville, Multilateralism as Terror:
International Law, Haiti and Imperialism, FINNISH Y.B. INT'L L. 18 (2009),
available at http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/783 (suggesting that the international
community merely legitimizes acts of imperialism in the name of promoting
democracy when it declares as legal invasions of sovereign states such as Haiti and
Iraq).
68. See generally KANT, supra note 26, at 99-102 ("The republican constitution
is not only pure in its origin . . . it also offers a prospect of attaining the desired
result, i.e. a perpetual peace .... ).
69. Id. at 102-104 (arguing that the world should not be one government but
instead a "federalism of free states").
70. Id. at 100. Kant notes that republican constitutions require action by the
citizens to go to war whereas other governmental structures do not-they only
require the head of the state to make a decision. Therefore, going to war in a
republican state is harder, causing republican states to be more peaceful).
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checks that were part of the republican system would prevent states
from going to war for reasons of aggression and expansion. Kant
suggested, further, that his vision could become a reality through a
process by which a federation of republican states would form, and
then gradually expand in their reach and membership. Kant's theory
exerted an extraordinary power in the fields of American political
science and international relations-disciplines anxious to formulate
a set of empirically verifiable principles that would plausibly explain
and predict the behavior of states. Thus, emerged the democratic
peace theory-the theory that democratic states (rather than the
republican states mentioned by Kant) do not go to war with each
other. As President Obama points out, apparently adopting and
affirming this thesis, "America has never fought a war against a
democracy."7 1 For political scientists, this principle is the closest
political science comes to establishing a principle of international
relations.
The Bush administration made the promotion of democracy a
center piece of many of its most significant policies, as articulated in
its two National Security Strategies.72 Democratic states were not
only peaceful, but they were an antidote to the emergence of
terrorism. Thus the reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan into
democratic societies became a central feature of U.S. policies
regarding those countries. "Rogue states," most prominently the
"Axis of Evil," were posited as the contrast to legitimate, democratic
states. Preemptive self-defense could be deployed against these
states, even if they did not actually engage in action that would,
under the U.N. Charter, justify the use of force.
Even as the United States sought to promote democracy abroad, its
own practices and policies raised new issues about the relationship
between democracy, international law, and international community.
71. Obama, supra note 29.
72. See generally THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (2002), available at http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/ (asserting that "freedom, democracy, and
free enterprise" represent the "single sustainable model for national success"); THE
WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA (2006), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/
nsc/nss/2006/ (reiterating that "the advance of liberty [in other countries] will
make America more secure").
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A very influential and articulate group of scholars, sometimes termed
"The New Sovereigntists," argued that international law suffers from
a democratic deficit." While there is certainly some truth to this
claim, it is somewhat ironic that this argument is made in relation to
the United States which, after all, is the most powerful country in the
world, possesses a permanent seat on the Security Council, and holds
decisive control over the actions of many of the most significant
international institutions in the world, including the World Bank and
the International Monetary Fund. The broad argument made by these
scholars is that international law lacks legitimacy and that-its
binding power is only to the extent that it is incorporated into the
domestic law of the United States in accordance with the
Constitution. It is the Constitution that governs, as opposed to
international law. It is the Constitution that properly embodies a
legitimate system of governance, established by, and responsive to,
the needs of the American people. This line of argument corresponds
to Kant's view that international government could easily become a
tyranny. But, the position is further complicated by another related
set of arguments which assert that in a time of emergency, executive
powers expand significantly; the "War on Terror" represents such an
emergency. In this situation, the constraints that democratic
sovereignty is supposed to ensure are diminished.
The overall and somewhat disturbing result may be one in which
the democratic sovereign is unconstrained by external laws-
international laws-precisely because these would violate the
principles and values underlying democratic norms. At the same
time, domestic constraints on the executive are diminished by the
invocation of emergency-a condition whose existence is to be
determined by the Executive. The consequence is the emergence of a
democratic state that is in some way a hyper-sovereign state free of
any restrictions. The question then arises: what are the limits, if any,
on what a democratic state in a time of emergency may do? This is
73. But see Peter J. Spiro, The New Sovereigntists: American Exceptionalism
and Its False Prophets, 79 FOREIGN AFF. 9, 11-12 (2000) (rejecting the New
Sovereigntists' arguments that international lawmaking is democratically deficient
because international organizations lack accountability and certain regimes persist
in committing human rights violations and contending that the New Sovereigntists
overlook the fact that "international organizations are not free-floating entities with
unconfined powers," but rather "they are kept on the usually tight leash by their
nation-state members").
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especially problematic when the whole democratic process is
distorted by powerful and persistent invocations of grave danger and
of weapons of mass destruction. If then, in the name of democratic
government, a state is entitled to disregard the basic principles of
international law regarding human rights and the use of force, the
distinction between a democratic state and a rogue state becomes
unclear. Indeed, paradoxically, it is the hyper-sovereign, that may, in
the name of democracy, cause massive disruption and instability in
the international system.
A broader set of issues arises about the relationship between
democracy and international law. For instance, the NATO war
against Kosovo was clearly illegal. Does the fact, however, that this
war was conducted by a group of democratic states give it a different
quality, and make it somehow legitimate, even if illegal? Should
democratic states have a special status when it comes to participation
in international institutions, or indeed, in international law making?
Many of the projects that derive, in one way or another, from
democratic peace theory must now be seriously challenged and
questioned. It may be true that democratic states do not go to war
with each other. But it is clear, even from a cursory study of United
States foreign policy, that democratic states undermined other
democratic states. The United States presents itself as striving to
create democratic states from rogue states - and the transformation of
Japan and Germany in this regard, after the Second World War,
count as very notable successes. However, the United States, in
several instances, also transformed democratic states into rogue
states. Iran, now a pre-eminent rogue state was once a democratic
state, but then the United States displaced the democratically elected
leader and installed the Shah of Iran in order to protect its own oil
interests.74 Similarly, the United States displaced the democratically
elected leader of Chile, Salvador Allende, and enabled the dictatorial
rule of Augusto Pinochet.
In other cases, democratic states continue to support various
74. See generally STEPHEN KINZER, ALL THE SHAH'S MEN: AN AMERICAN
COUP AND THE ROOTS OF MIDDLE EAST TERROR (2003) (chronicling the events
surrounding the 1953 U.S. CIA-staged coup d'etat that replaced Iran's
democratically elected government, led by Mohammed Mossadegh, with a
dictatorship led by Mohammed Reza Pahlavi).
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tyrannies for strategic and policy reasons, even while proclaiming the
virtues of democracy. The project of promoting democracy, such a
central part of the "War on Terror," also confronted many problems
that make it somewhat doubtful that sustainable and meaningful
democracy can be imposed from above, through external agencies.
The initial grand ambitions to transform Iraq and Afghanistan into
democratic states have been somewhat diminished.
The democratic peace theory, which seems to have implicitly been
adopted by both Presidents Bush and Obama, appears now to be
problematic for a number of reasons. The idea that democratic states
should enjoy a special status in international law undermined a
fundamental principle of international law-that all sovereign states
are equal, regardless of their government. Furthermore, the idea that
democratic states are somehow more inherently virtuous in their
international dealings is extremely questionable given that two
famously democratic states, the United States and the United
Kingdom, caused such massive disruption to the international system
through their illegal invasion of Iraq. Related to this issue is a danger
of dividing the world into democratic and non-democratic states to
the extent that it suggests that different systems or principles should
be used for each set of states. This could easily result in a replication
of an older, imperial system of international law, one which is
founded on the basic premise of a division of the world into civilized
states that are bound by international law, and uncivilized states that
are somehow outside the pale and the realm of international law.
I attempted to trace the trajectory of the evolution of democratic
sovereignty, a relatively new version of sovereignty doctrine that
builds on the powerful idea of human rights. It is very much a
product of the world that came into existence with the fall of the
Berlin Wall. Doctrines of sovereignty and human rights exist in
tension with each other. Additionally, the basic idea of democratic
sovereignty challenges the conventional idea that sovereignty
prevails by asserting that a state that does not preserve democratic
rights is somehow less sovereign. The broad idea that a state's failure
to adhere to fundamental human rights norms will undermine its own
status is now powerfully expressed through the principle of the
responsibility to protect.
In the midst of these recent developments, however, it is useful to
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return to another alternative vision of sovereignty, one that arguably
endured through all these recent renditions of sovereignty. The
principles underlying this approach derived from the Bandung
Conference in 1955 1 and include: "(1) mutual respect for
sovereignty and territorial integrity; (2) mutual nonaggression; (3)
noninterference in each other's internal affairs; (4) equality and
mutual benefit; and (5) peaceful coexistence.""6 This approach
disavows a system based on a distinction between friends and
enemies. This conceptualization of sovereignty served as the
foundation of the Declaration of Friendly Relations Among States,
one of the most notable documents to emerge from the efforts of the
recently de-colonized states to establish a new system of
international law." The Non-Aligned Movement broadly espouses
this traditional approach to sovereignty, one which clearly gives
greater emphasis to sovereignty than to human rights, as suggested
by points 1 and 3. In this respect, the Bandung version of sovereignty
contrasts markedly with the democratic sovereignty approach. The
Bandung version of sovereignty is more aligned with a classical
approach to international law whereby the internal character of a
state is irrelevant and what matters is whether a state abides by its
75. Final Communiqu6 of the Asian-African Conference, Bandung (Apr. 24,
1955), available at
http://www.namegypt.org/Relevant%20Documents/O0AsianAfricanConference[
1].pdf (declaring the common concerns, interests, and intentions of twenty-four
participating countries to achieve fuller economic, cultural, and political
cooperation for their people through specific steps of economic cooperation).
76. See Zhiyuan Cui, The Bush Doctrine and Neoconservatism: A Chinese
Perspective, 46 HARV. INT'L L.J. 403, 410 (2005) (confirming that in 1982, five
principles elicited at the Bandung Conference "were written into the Constitution
of the People's Republic of China"); see also Final Communiqu6 of the Asian-
African Conference, supra note 75 (listing ten principles that Bandung Conference
participants agreed would assist in the practice of "tolerance," "liv[ing] together in
peace," and "friendly cooperation").
77. Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. Doc. A/8082 (Oct. 24, 1970)
(proclaiming the principles that States shall refrain from threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State; that States
shall settle their international disputes peacefully; that States not interfere in the
domestic jurisdiction of any State; that States cooperate with one another in
accordance with the U.N. Charter; that States promote the realization of equal
rights and self-determination; that all States have sovereign equality; and that all
States fulfill in good faith their obligations under the U.N. Charter).
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international obligations in its external relations with regard to other
states. As discussed, the democratic sovereignty thesis suggests that
a clear distinction should be made between democratic and non-
democratic states, and that the internal, sociological character of a
state should affect its sovereign status. In this respect it reverses
many of the most central tenets of the more traditional view. How
the tensions between these different ideas of sovereignty will be
managed remains to be seen.
In conclusion, let me be clear. I think democracy-whatever its
problems, and however complex its definition-is the best form of
government, and I believe that the international system should be
oriented towards its promotion. It is, of course, within the rights of a
country to decide on the countries with which it will affiliate and
how it will affiliate with them. However, I do not think that the issue
of democracy can be usefully connected to the sovereign status of a
country and I am unsure whether the international system as a whole
should adopt this approach. We require new ways of thinking about
this relationship between sovereignty and democracy. The principle
of responsibility to protect embodies many of the ideas of democratic
sovereignty and what we are witnessing now is an ongoing debate, if
not contest, between these two versions of sovereignty which differ
in the significance they attribute to the character of internal
government.
5. NATIONAL AND REGIONAL APPROACHES TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW
My broad theme here is that there now seems to exist a sense that
international law is more open to non-Western initiatives than it was
for many decades. One sign of this is the emergence of the Asian
Society of International Law and the African Foundation for
International Law. More generally, the emergence of Brazil, India
and China led many scholars to refer to a power shift in international
relations. The implications of these developments for international
law have yet to emerge, but it is arguable that the non-Western world
has not had such an opportunity to engage with and shape
international law since the days immediately following
decolonization in the 1960s and 1970s. In seeking to understand this
phenomenon, I attempt to explore, however superficially, the ways in
which African and Asian states responded to the challenges and
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opportunities presented by international law.
Following the fall of the Berlin Wall, the twenty year period from
1989 to 2009 was powerfully driven by the thesis of The End of
History?, even though this thesis was recognized as superficial and
inadequate." The End of History? thesis appeared to be affirmed by
events that occurred over the years between 1989 and 2009: history
ended; the West emerged triumphant; and the Western model of
society, liberal democracy and free markets, decisively was
established as the model that all sensible societies should aspire to
become. The task confronting the non-European world, then, was to
work out a way of replicating this model. In broad terms, all the
answers to the most important social, political, and economic
problems lay in the West. Indigenous knowledge was only useful to
the extent that it could provide information about the peculiar and
unique local conditions and languages that needed to be translated
and transformed to enable progress towards the decisive model of the
Western liberal-democratic state. This hierarchy, this division, is
preserved in the organizational structure of many international
institutions and agencies working in the developing world; the
authoritative international expert has access to the universal
disciplines of human rights or development, whereas the local
workers are only knowledgeable about their own particular
conditions. In the field of international law, The End of History?
thesis translated into several initiatives of intervention and
transformation that were embraced by numerous international
institutions. The promotion of free markets and the rule of law
became central projects for international economic law and its many
sub-disciplines. International human rights law too played a crucial
role in this overall process by espousing the related cause of good
governance that was seen as essential to promote development and
human welfare.
All the major international legal and policy initiatives that
emerged at this time were driven by the West. These included the
creation of the World Trade Organization ("WTO"), and the
intensification of globalization through the actions of international
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financial institutions that expanded their activities to an
unprecedented extent and, more broadly, through the International
Criminal Court and the "Responsibility to Protect" doctrine.7 9 While
the developing countries were sufficiently concerned about the
expansive ambitions of the WTO to oppose, for instance, the
Multilateral Agreement on Investments," they were largely reactive
to Western initiatives rather than authoring any ambitious and
coherent international initiatives themselves. The ill-fated Durban
process was the one possible exception to this situation. The "Asian
Values" debate was also a limited, and not altogether helpful,
challenge to the dominant view."
In recent times, however, the global prospect has altered
significantly as a result of two major developments, the war on terror
and the global financial crisis, both of which have profoundly
undermined Western claims to moral authority and superiority. The
war on terror raised extremely difficult problems regarding the
relationship between security and human rights. While the Obama
administration took a number of measures to restore human rights,
the ongoing controversies about the closure of Guantanamo, the
treatment of prisoners, and interrogation techniques all represent an
unmistakable shift towards giving security priority over human
rights. This shift in the West is especially ironic for a number of
reasons. The West continuously asserted the primacy of human rights
over other values such as development and stability, most notably in
response to Asian states that argued that human rights needed to be
adapted and qualified in some way in order to achieve some measure
of security and economic growth. Now, when the United States was
attacked, the Bush Administration dispensed with the inalienable
character of significant human rights and proceeded to launch two
major wars against countries that were not directly responsible for
those attacks.82 It appears to me that many commentators in the West
79. See generally Gareth Evans & Mohamed Sahnoun, The Responsibility to
Protect, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Nov./Dec. 2002.
80. The Multilateral Agreement on Investment, Draft Consolidated Text,
OECD Doc. DAFFE/MAI(98)7/REV1 (Apr. 22, 1998).
81. For a far reaching analysis of the Asian values debate, see Yash Ghai,
Asian Perspectives on Human Rights, 23 HONG KONG L.J. 342 (1993).
82. U.S. involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq has been collectively deemed
"The War on Terror," but Afghanistan itself was not directly responsible for the
attack of 9/11 and, despite various claims made leading up to the war on Iraq, the
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still do not properly appreciate how these wars, particularly the war
in Iraq, are viewed by the larger international community.13 The
irony, then, was that the West was replicating in many ways a
version of the "Asian Values" argument regarding the priority that
security should be given over human rights. In the West, very
importantly, active human rights and other non-governmental
organizations and resolutely independent judiciaries ensured some
measure of transparency and accountability and placed some
restraint on government power. However, the "War on Terror" made
things very difficult for human rights organizations and activists
within developing countries because their arguments for rights
seemed far removed from reality a reality that appeared to be
grasped by the United States in its response to the threats posed by
terrorism.
The global financial collapse further undermined Western claims
to omnipotent knowledge. The ironies involved in this situation were
many. In 1997, Timothy Geithner and Larry Summers were hailed as
the brilliant economists who rescued the world from potential
calamity following the Asian economic crisis. In 2008, however,
Geithner and Summers were desperately attempting to salvage the
U.S. economy, the excesses of which had undermined the entire
global system. Asian countries did not fail to notice that Western
countries seeking to consolidate their economies adopted precisely
the policies that they had wanted to implement, reducing interest
Bush Administration provided no direct evidence that Iraq had any connection
with that attack. This is discussed in greater detail below.
83. One glimpse is provided by the prominent Singaporean scholar and
diplomat, Kishore Mahbubani, who states that: "The decision by the US and UK to
invade and occupy Iraq in March 2003 will go down as a seismic error, one of the
greatest acts of folly of our age. Few recent disasters are as multidimensional."
KISHORE MAHBUBANI, THE NEW ASIAN HEMISPHERE: THE IRRESISTIBLE SHIFT OF
GLOBAL POWER TO THE EAST 177 (2008) [hereinafter MAHBUBANI, NEW ASIAN
HEMISPHERE]. It is especially notable that Mahbubani sees himself as a friend to
the West, and has attempted in his work to provide what might be described as a
friendly critique. See, e.g., KISHORE MAHBUBANI, BEYOND THE AGE OF
INNOCENCE: REBUILDING TRUST BETWEEN AMERICA AND THE WORLD Xiii-XX
(2005) (suggesting that Americans have generally been unaware of how heavily
the decisions of the United States impact the rest of the world and contending that
the United States can no longer act without regard for the effects of its actions).
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rates and increasing government spending in an attempt to stimulate
the economy. However, international financial institutions prevented
Asian countries from doing so because their policies were, in effect,
dictated by the Western countries. Rightly or wrongly, this was
perceived as a double standard." Further, the crisis suggested that the
International Monetary Fund ("IMF") and the World Bank were
structurally incapable of addressing the crisis in any meaningful way
because the crisis originated in the West-in the most developed
states-and these were same the states that effectively ran these
institutions. The models of economy and society that the West has
been advocating are now powerfully undermined, and it is difficult to
think of a time where the credibility of the West is more in question.
The one corresponding time may be the end of the Great War. With
all due respect, the credibility of the West will be undermined for as
long as the war in Afghanistan continues.
The Geneva Conventions legitimize violence, even as they seek to
control the manner in which it is inflicted." But, even the limits of
the Geneva Conventions are invariably exceeded and outright
atrocities will, I fear, be a common and ongoing feature of these
wars. This will all inevitably undermine the credibility and status of
the West. The failure of the Afghanistan war is looming as a real
likelihood, and it is now difficult to know how actually to
conceptualize success in Afghanistan. Further, here in the West we
are preoccupied with the issue of the inequality arising from the fact
that terrorists do not obey international humanitarian law, but the
other inequality is the inequality of means- using drones versus real
people-however violent and fanatical they may be. This inequality
is, I think, evident to many people in the Third World. And then of
course there arises, once again, the issue of civilian casualties.
It is in the midst of these changes that many non-Western states
are seeking, once again, to make their voice heard in the international
84. An argument could be made, however, that the Asian Crisis of 1997 and
Global Financial Crisis of 2008 were quite different, as they involved very
different actors and required different policy responses.
85. See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (proffering rules for the
treatment of the wounded and of civilians not taking part in the hostilities of a civil
war, but permitting states to otherwise engage in violence within their own
territory).
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arena. The Asian Society of International Law was founded in 2007
for this purpose. In the program of the Society's 2009 Second
Biennial Conference, held in Tokyo, Japan, it was stated:
In the past, the international legal order was led by the West. The Asian
nations and peoples were limited to taking a reactive stance, merely
utilizing the given systems of international law and criticizing the points
with which they were dissatisfied. Such a reactive stance is not
appropriate for an Asia which equals the West economically and makes
arguments on an equal footing with the West. Asia needs to make its own
proposals regarding the manner in which international law can support the
world of the 21st century and realize the common interests of human
kind.86
Correspondingly, Asian leaders, such as the prime minister of
India, Manmohan Singh, have argued that:
Just as the world accommodated the rejuvenation of Europe in the post-
War world, it must now accommodate the rise of new Asian economies in
the years that lie ahead.
What this means is that we need global institutions and new global 'rules
of the game' that can facilitate the peaceful rise of new nations in Asia. It
also means that existing global institutions and frameworks of cooperation
must evolve and change to accommodate this new reality.8 7
Given these significant claims and developments, the question
then arises of briefly addressing, and assessing, the situation of
international law in the developing world.
Pioneering third world scholars, such as R.P. Anand, wrote
incisively about the claims and expectations of the new states as they
emerged from colonialism."8 Crucially, the new states sought to
86. International Law in a Multi-polar and Multi-civilizational World: Asian
Perspectives, Challenges and Contributions, THE SECOND BIENNIAL GENERAL
CONFERENCE OF THE ASIAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AT THE UNIVERSITY
OF TOKYO (Aug. 1-2, 2009).
87. Dr. Manmohan Singh, Prime Minister of India, speech to the LSE Asia
Forum 2006, (Dec. 7, 2006), available at http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/
LSEAsiaForum/pdf/ManmohanSingh OpeningAddress.pdf, cited in MAHBUBANI,
NEW ASIAN HEMISPHERE, supra note 83, at 235.
88. See generally R.P. ANAND, SOVEREIGN EQUALITY OF STATES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2008) (noting that while sovereignty and independence of
states are becoming fictions as the international community becomes more
interdependent, new states emerge that claim sovereignty and equality, but often
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reform international law and institutions to reflect the changed
realities of the international system; they did not attempt to
completely repudiate the international law that was so important in
furthering colonialism. It is clear, in retrospect, that the new states
had a somewhat optimistic idea that international law would promote
the cause of global justice. Correspondingly, they set about
formulating very large and ambitious programs relating, for example,
to the Law of Sea, the creation of a New International Economic
Order, and a Declaration on Friendly Relations Among States." All
these initiatives were furthered through the General Assembly, the
most representative organ of the United Nations, and the one body in
which the large numbers of the developing countries could have
some impact. The Third World countries enthusiastically adopted the
cause of international human rights law. Third World countries
promoted, for instance, norms of anti-discrimination, and initiated a
powerful campaign against apartheid in South Africa. Further, new
states attempted to use human rights as a means of furthering
projects of self-determination9 0 and development.91
Few of the great aspirations of the new states regarding
international law were fulfilled. As a consequence, as B.S.Chimni
argued in his important article on international law in India, many
require protection and assistance from the international community to maintain
their independence because of their meager populations and resources); R.P.
ANAND, NEW STATES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1972) (addressing issues arising
from the emergence of new, post-colonial states in Asia and Africa, which claim
legal sovereignty as a result of decolonization).
89. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397; Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International
Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3202 (S-VI), U.N. GAOR, 6th Special Sess., Supp.
No. 1, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (May 1, 1974); Declaration on Principles of International
Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th
Sess., Supp. No. 18, U.N. Doc. A/8018 (Oct. 24, 1970).
90. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights arts. 1(1),
2(1), Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (1976) (granting all peoples the right of
self-determination, which includes the ability to "freely determine their political
status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development").
91. See, e.g., Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 41/128, art.
1(1), U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., Supp. No. 53, U.N. Doc. A/41/53 (Dec. 4, 1986)
(defining development as a "comprehensive economic, social, cultural and political
process," and declaring that the right to development is an inalienable human
right).
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new states lost faith in the ability of international law to actually
change the system in order to further the interests of the people of the
Third World.9 2 Disillusion set in amongst many Third World scholars
of international law when the major initiatives relating to the Law of
the Sea and the New International Economic Order, for a number of
complex legal, political, and economic reasons, failed to make any
real progress.
It is also evident, however, that during this time, many developing
countries, while they no longer harbored any illusions about
changing the global system, began to use international law in
developing regional arrangements. Further, international human
rights law provided inspiration for the constitutional rights found in
many countries, such as South Africa. South Africa, in particular,
incorporated extensive economic and social rights in its
constitution." And, the efforts of the South African courts to give
effect to these rights have generated extraordinary jurisprudence, as
in the Grootboom case.94 It is in these settings, then, in both domestic
and regional systems, that many developing countries internalized
and adapted international legal norms for their own purposes. In so
doing, they added new and innovative dimensions to areas such as
international human rights law. Scholars such as Henry Richardson, 95
Adrien Wing," Penny Andrews,97 Makau Mutua," Jeremy Levitt, 99
92. See B.S. Chimni, International Law Scholarship in Post-colonial India:
Coping with Dualism, LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 23, 42 (2010) (describing the 1980s and
90s as a period of disillusionment with international law for reasons such as the
refusal of the United States to ratify the Law of the Sea Convention, the collapse of
the Soviet Union, and the general neglect of the United Nations).
93. See generally S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, 1996 (providing South Africa's Bill of
Rights).
94. See Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom 2000 (1) SA 1 (CC) at 1-3, 65-
68 paras. 1-4, 93-99 (S. Afr.) (declaring that the government failed to provide
adequate housing under its constitutional obligations and ordering the state to
create a program to ensure adequate housing for South African citizens); see also
JEANNE M. WOODS & HOPE LEWIS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE GLOBAL
MARKETPLACE: ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL DIMENSIONS 743-54 (2005)
(reviewing Grootboom and providing commentary).
95. See, e.g., HENRY J. RICHARDSON III, THE ORIGINS OF AFRICAN-AMERICAN
INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2008) (studying the ways in which people of
African heritage began to participate in international law even though they lacked
formal standing to engage in the international legal process because it emerged
during the slave trade).
96. See, e.g., GLOBAL CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: AN INTERNATIONAL READER
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and Hope Lewis and Jeanne Woods 00 all did important work in
exploring the ways in which Africa and African-Americans absorbed
and contributed to the development of international law. Obiora
Okafor's recent work, for instance, superbly examined how
international norms may be used to animate local activists in their
work.101
This same theme is evident in the creation of regional
organizations such as the African Union, and, in particular, Article 4
of its protocol, which basically endorses intervention in the event of
humanitarian problems.102 In this respect, Africa significantly moved
towards embracing some of the fundamental principles of the
responsibility to protect which, despite being discussed and
(Adrien Katherine Wing ed., 2000) (acknowledging the failure of international law
to adequately protect and promote the rights of women of color).
97. See, e.g., Penelope E. Andrews, Making Room for Critical Race Theory in
International Law: Some Practical Pointers, 45 VILL. L. REV. 855 (2000)
(claiming that developing nations have encouraged the evolution of international
human rights law to address the variety of needs that face the developing world).
98. See, e.g., MAKAU MUTUA, HUMAN RIGHTS: A POLITICAL AND CULTURAL
CRITIQUE (2002) (critiquing the human rights movement as a Eurocentric attack on
non-Western cultures and peoples, and encouraging that movement to adopt a
more multicultural approach).
99. See, e.g., AFRICA: MAPPING NEW BOUNDARIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(Jeremy Levitt ed., 2008).
100. See, e.g., WOODS & LEWIS, supra note 94 (addressing the need for greater
recognition of economic, social, and cultural rights as globalization continues to
increase the disparity between the wealthy and the poor).
101. See generally OBIORA CHINEDU OKAFOR, THE AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS
SYSTEM, ACTIVIST FORCES, AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS (2007) (asserting
that although the African human rights system may not achieve direct state
compliance with international norms, its principles can be implemented by local
human rights activists through the establishment of a human rights network that
infiltrates key domestic institutions).
102. Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of
the African Union art. 4(j)-(k), July 9, 2002, available at http://www.africa-
union.org/ruleprot/PROTOCOL-%20PEACE%20AND%20SECURITY%2OCOU
NCIL%200F%20THE%20AFRICAN%20UNION.pdf (affording the African
Union the right "to intervene in a Member State . . . in respect of grave
circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity" and
giving Member States the right to "request intervention from the Union in order to
restore peace and security"). The Peace and Security Council's intervention
decisions require either a consensus or a two-thirds majority vote by Member
States. Id. art. 8(13).
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elaborated at many international conferences and U.N. forums,
remains a controversial issue internationally. Furthermore, a great
deal has happened in Africa which raises questions about
intervention, sovereignty, and restoration of democracy. It certainly
may be the case that this legal regime did not work as it should have.
The ongoing conflict in Darfur presents an enormous problem to the
African Union and the international community generally.103 -
Nevertheless, the fact that such a regime, which quite radically
undermines traditional concepts of sovereignty should exist in the
first place, is quite remarkable.
Asian states do not possess a regional human rights system that
compares with the African or Inter-American systems. Integration in
the Association of South East Asian Nations ("ASEAN") has not
progressed as far as in many other parts of the world. While
integration for political and human rights purposes was limited in
Asia, however, many Asian countries entered into free trade and
investment agreements, such as the treaty between China and
ASEAN.
It is clear now that Asia, with the emergence of India and China, is
one of the most dynamic regions of the world. Yet, it is interesting to
note that a recent conference that took place in Singapore concluded
that Asia is a status quo power. The conference described the state of
governance in Asia in the following way:
There is wide agreement in Asia that the approach to global governance
should be one of evolution rather than revolution. Asians want to grow
and perpetuate the global system, not revolutionize or reset it. . . . The
challenge to redesigning global governance is that Asians are generally
'status quo' powers. The rising powers are reluctant to lead, and the
falling powers are unable to lead. At the same time, the region's
evolutionary approach towards greater cooperation is by nature messy and
random.104
103. See MAHMOOD MAMDANI, SAVIORS AND SURVIVORS: DARFUR, POLITICS,
AND THE WAR ON TERROR 39-47 (2009) (acknowledging that rebels in the Darfur
conflict specifically targeted the African Union in violent attacks and kidnappings,
but ultimately arguing that the African Union had a coherent political response to
the complexities of the Darfur conflict and that the Union's response was weak
because the United Nations, driven by the EU and the United States, failed to
support it).
104. KISHORE MAHBUBANI & SIMON CHESTERMAN, ASIA'S ROLE IN GLOBAL
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Asian states, then, have not perhaps adopted and adapted
international law to the same extent as Latin-American and African
states. And yet, it is clear that Asian states such as Korea were
extremely successful in promoting development and establishing
themselves as significant economic powers. In explaining how this
occurred, scholars such as Ha-Joon Chang pointed out that the
Korean model involved a dual process of manufacturing for exports
while also protecting infant industries until they were capable of
competing in the international arena. 105 This led to the emergence of
major Korean corporations such as Samsung and Hyundai, all of
which are now world famous brands. It is this approach to the global
economy, rather than the neo-liberal version that calls for complete
liberalization of all aspects of the economy, that proved successful.
Clearly, Korea, like many of the emerging developing countries,
became experienced in dealing with major international institutions.
Brazil, for instance, another emerging economy, became one of the
most active and successful countries in using the WTO to further its
own trade policies. 06
The economic success of many Asian countries was widely noted
and analyzed; however, no less remarkable, although less
commented on, is the relative political stability established in South-
East Asia. It is quite astonishing, for example, that Indonesia, the
largest Islamic country in the world, has not been racked by
instability, particularly given that the country went through so many
different crises: the Asian economic crisis of 1997, the independence
GOVERNANCE (2009), available at http://www.spp.nus.edu.sg/docs/Jan2010_
SpecialReport Asia Role inGlobalGovernance.pdf.
105. See HA-JOON CHANG, BAD SAMARITANS: THE MYTH OF FREE TRADE AND
THE SECRET HISTORY OF CAPITALISM 72-73 (2008) (asserting that free trade
policies work well for rich nations, but are a poor fit for developing nations that
lack organizational structure and mechanisms to support free trade); HA-JOON
CHANG, KICKING AWAY THE LADDER: DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE 59-66 (2002) (recognizing that many of today's successful industrial
nations, "from eighteenth-century Britain to twentieth-century Korea," followed
infant industry protection policies at some point, but noting that there is no proof
that such policies contributed to the industrial success of those nations).
106. See, e.g., Gregory Shaffer et at., The Trials of Winning at the WTO: What
Lies Behind Brazil's Success, 41 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 383, 387-94 (2008) (linking
the rise of partnerships between the private sector, civil society, and the public
sector on trade matters to Brazil's success and ability to effectively engage in trade
negotiations and dispute settlements).
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of East Timor, the end of the Suharto regime, and then the tsunami of
2004. It is a remarkable achievement of Indonesia and its leadership
that the country made so much progress despite all these difficulties.
I argued that, broadly, Asia adopted and adapted international law
rather than innovating in the way that Africa and Latin America did.
And yet, as scholars such as Christopher Weeramantry and Onuma
Yasuaki pointed out, the old civilizations of Asia have much to offer
the world in terms of some of the most fundamental issues of
international law, including sustainable development, and questions
of war and peace. Some of these ideas are quite unique. In his
judgment on the Nuclear Weapons Case, for instance, Judge
Weeramantry quotes the Buddhist approach to war:
According to Buddhism there is nothing that can be called a 'just war'
which is only a false term coined and put into circulation to justify and
excuse hatred, cruelty, violence and massacre. Who decides what is just
and unjust? . .. Our war is always 'just' and your war is always 'unjust'.
Buddhism does not accept this position. 107
The position asserted here is radical; it contrasts markedly with the
just war tradition that emerged in the West over many centuries,
influenced by major scholars such as St Augustine, by undermining
the very concept of just war. The quotation may also seem entirely
unrealistic because, while repudiating the idea of just war, it does not
present any solution to the ongoing problem of violence. It seems to
advocate non-violence without presenting any real alternative means
of addressing the world as it is-which is in a situation where, in the
words of President Obama, "[e]vil does exist . . ."10 In this respect,
the Buddhist position stated here has much in common with the non-
violence advocated by Gandhi and King, and which President Obama
finds so persuasive at one level, and yet, like Buddhism, inadequate,
as he stated in full: "For make no mistake: Evil does exist in the
world. A non-violent movement could not have halted Hitler's
armies. Negotiations cannot convince al Qaeda's leaders to lay down
their arms."109
We might think of the teachings of Buddhism, as having limited
107. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,1996
I.C.J. 226, 481 (July 8) (Weeramantry, J., dissenting).
108. Obama, supra note 29.
109. Id.
1354 [26:5
INTERNATIONAL LA WIN A TIME OF CHANGE
application, the whole stance of non-violence being contingent on the
particular political forces in place at the time. However, rather than
dismiss this passage as unrealistic or theoretical, I would like to
suggest that it should be taken seriously-and that it is powerfully
realistic in a number of compelling ways. The passage points to one
of the fundamental problems with just war-who is to decide? And
of course, in the world of international law, the problem is especially
acute, as it is very rare for some impartial body to declare a particular
war to be just or unjust. Furthermore, at the very least, the passage
suggests that we need to think very scrupulously and carefully about
the deployment of the term 'just war.'
President Obama implicitly speaks of the war in Afghanistan as so
manifestly a 'just war' that the issue requires no elaboration: "The
world rallied around America after the 9/11 attacks, and continues to
support our efforts in Afghanistan and ... the recognized principle of
self-defense.""o There appeared to be widespread support for some
sort of military action against Afghanistan in 2001. A question might
arise as to how universally the American and NATO efforts in
Afghanistan are indeed supported now. My own anecdotal view is
that a significant disparity exists between the way in which the
United States and the European Union view this war, and how it is
perceived elsewhere. Furthermore, I would question the argument
that the war on Afghanistan falls within the scope of traditional just
war theory-at least to the extent that this theory can be said to be
embodied in the U.N. Charter."' The U.N. Security Council passed a
somewhat ambiguous and open-ended resolution regarding
Afghanistan, which cannot easily be read as explicitly and
unequivocally authorizing the use of force against Afghanistan." 2
Neither, of course, did Afghanistan actually attack the United States;
rather, the attacks were orchestrated by Al-Qaeda, which was
operating in Afghanistan. Under international law, as developed in
110. Id.
111. This points to two issues-first, whether "just war" has a particular scope
(the Grotian idea of a just war was extraordinarily broad); and second, the
relationship between customary law relating to the use of force and the U.N.
Charter. Arguments have been made that customary law is more expansive and has
survived the U.N. Charter.
112. See generally S.C. Res. 1386, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1386 (Dec. 20, 2001)
(authorizing Member States to take all necessary measures to maintain a secure
environment in Afghanistan, but declining to explicitly authorize the use of force).
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the Nicaragua Case,"l3 the actions of Al-Qaeda could only be
attributed to Afghanistan, if a series of tests were satisfied. It is only
then that the Al-Qaeda attack could be characterized as an attack by
Afghanistan on the United States, justifying the use of force in self-
defense by the United States under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter,
which speaks of the use of self-defense in response to an armed
attack.114
It is doubtful whether the Nicaragua test was met by Afghanistan.
Neither can it be easily argued, under the rules of state responsibility,
that the actions of Al-Qaeda were those of Afghanistan,"'5 or that
Afghanistan committed an internationally wrongful act of state with
regard to direct involvement in the 9/11 attacks. Harboring or failing
to surrender Al-Qaeda leaders, particularly of course, Osama bin
Laden, may have given rise to state responsibility. But, then there is
the question of whether this would have legally justified the all-out
war waged on Afghanistan. This analysis depends on making a
distinction between committing terroristic acts and harboring
terrorists. Under international law as it existed in 2001, this
distinction would have been valid and different rules would have
applied. President Bush, of course, precisely and famously dispensed
with this distinction when he asserted in his very first speech after
9/11 that no distinction would be made between terrorists and those
who harbor them." 6 This position has been the basis of the war
113. See generally Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27) (resolving a dispute
between the United States and Nicaragua regarding whether certain military and
paramilitary actions within Nicaragua were an unlawful intervention by the United
States and ultimately deciding that the United States was not responsible for those
actions because it did not have complete control over the military and paramilitary
operations at issue).
114. See U.N. Charter art. 51 (affording U.N. Member States with the inherent
right to individual or collective self-defense in the case of an armed attack, but also
requiring that Member States report an exercise of this right to the Security
Council).
115. The issue of state responsibility has been widely analyzed and discussed in
the International Law Commission. For articles relevant to the questions of an
internationally wrongful act of state giving rise to state responsibility, and the
question of countermeasures, see Draft Articles on Responsibility of states for
Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries, 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N pt. 2,
arts. 9, 11, 40, 49, 52, U.N. Doc. A/56/10/2001.
116. See George Bush, President of the United States of America, Speech to a
Joint Session of Congress (Sept. 20, 2001), available at
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against Afghanistan.
It is also clear that, from a political perspective, the war against
Afghanistan was very broadly supported by the international
community, at least at the time it was commenced. From a legal
point of view, the question remains as to what the law is in relation
to states that harbor terrorists and whether the act of harboring now
justifies the use of force in self-defense. This would represent a
significant change to interpretations of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter
as it has been traditionally understood.1 17 More particularly, for our
purposes, it would suggest a major transformation in terms of just
war as articulated in the Charter."' What is interesting, however, is
that this profound change appears to have occurred in a way that
does not attract much attention, even though it has generated much
uncertainty. Is one action, one war, capable of changing the
fundamental law relating to the use of force? What are the
implications of such a change for many of the other tensions existing
around the globe? Can India now legally use force against Pakistan
for supporting guerrilla groups in Kashmir?
The basic question, then, is who decides what is just and unjust? Is
it only when the world's major super power decides on a particular
use of force that falls outside the conventional understanding of the
U.N. Charter that this action itself generates new law in some way?
The question posed by Buddhist teachings, then, is not something to
be simply dismissed as idealistic or theoretical: rather, it raises issues
that are timely and urgent and enduring.1 9 And Martin Luther King,
http://middleeast.about.com/od/usmideastpolicy/a/bush-war-on-terror-speech.htm
(condemning Afghanistan for sheltering and supplying terrorists and declaring that
any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded as a
"hostile regime" in the "War on Terror").
117. See U.N. Charter art. 51. There is also the issue of what sorts of actions are
justified under the Security Council Resolutions passed shortly after 9/11. See
generally S.C. Res. 1386, supra note 112; S.C. Res. 1383, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1383
(Dec. 6, 2001); S.C. Res. 1378, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1378 (Nov. 14, 2001).
118. See U.N. Charter art. 51.
119. Carl Schmitt, seems to make the same point about the indeterminable and
expedient nature of just war doctrine, although his approach to the issue is simply
to assert that the sovereign decides what is just and unjust. See CARL SCHMITT,
THE NOMOS OF THE EARTH: IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE JUS PUBLICUM
EUROPAEUM 156-57 (G.L. Ulmen trans., 2003) (noting recognizing all sovereign
states as equals, it has made it more difficult to determine authoritatively whether a
war is just). Given all the complexities of the criteria of just war, Schmitt argues:
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Jr.'s great 1967 speech on America's involvement in Vietnam
contains, I would suggest, a profound wisdom from which we might
still learn.120
There is another aspect of President Obama's qualified use of
Martin Luther King, Jr. and Gandhi that I find problematic-his
broad argument that their great teachings are relevant in some
circumstances, and not in others. That has to do with precisely the
crucial question of how this critical issue of relevance is to be
decided. It is notable, for instance, that President Obama, speaking
explicitly as Commander in Chief, asserted the hard truth that
"[t]here will be times when nations-acting individually or in
concert-will find the use of force not only necessary but morally
justified."l21 In his major speech in Cairo, however, President Obama
asserted that "[riesistance through violence and killing is wrong and
does not succeed."l 22 Further, he also stated: "This same story can be
told by people from South Africa to South Asia; from Eastern
Europe to Indonesia. It's a story with a simple truth: that violence is
a dead end."1 23 Of course, the context in which President Obama
made this powerful claim was extremely fraught. He urged that
"There can be only a decisionist answer: each sovereign state-person decides
autonomously concerning justa causa. The state that does not decide remains
neutral and, vice versa, the neutral state abstains from deciding the justice or
injustice of the belligerent states." Id. at 157. Schmitt's views, of course, have
profound implications for the non-European/Western world, which while central to
his jurisprudence, is entirely absent from his concern because the non-European
world was regarded as lacking sovereignty for many centuries. As a consequence,
non-European entities would be inherently incapable of making 'just war.' I have
explored some of the implications of this position in Imperialism, Sovereignty and
the Making of International Law. See generally ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM,
SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2004).
120. See generally Martin Luther King, Jr., Speech at Riverside Church, New
York City: Beyond Vietnam - A Time to Break Silence (April 4, 1967), available
at http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/mlkatimetobreaksilence.htm
(condemning the United States' justification of its involvement in Vietnam as a
way to combat communism, particularly as the United States had previously
refused to help liberate the Vietnamese people from French control, and
advocating for the promotion of democracy through peaceful means).
121. Obama, supra note 29.
122. Barack Obama, President of the United States, Remarks at Cairo
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"Palestinians must abandon violence."1 2 4 This is completely in
keeping with the teaching of King and Gandhi. However, violence
engaged in by the United States is termed force and given a different
resonance and legitimacy. How then are we to distinguish between
different forms of violence, between legitimate and illegitimate
violence? We may also return to the question posed by the Buddhist
teaching: "[w]ho decides what is just and unjust?"l25 Is it only
sovereign entities that can engage in "just war?"'2 6 Or do we
distinguish even further between democratic and undemocratic
states, whereby democratic states may engage in wars that are illegal
under the strict application of law, but nevertheless somehow
legitimate?
It is for this reason that I believe the unrealistic teachings of the
great philosophers and religious thinkers are eminently practical and
equally capable of presenting hard truths about which we need to
keep reminding ourselves. Similarly, while there has been an
immense effort to promote democracy within states, democracy
between states, in the international system itself, continues to present
a major challenge. This is precisely the argument made by
developing countries-that they should be granted a greater role in
the international system. Complex factors caused the failure of the
Copenhagen summit to make any real progress on climate change
issues; but it is notable, for example, that Sir Nicholas Stem,
attributed that failure at least in part to the arrogance of the
developed countries.127
6. THIRD WORLD APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL
LAW
I belong to a network of scholars called Third World Approaches
to International Law or "TWAIL." Everything I have said so far in
124. Id.
125. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,1996
I.C.J. 226, 481 (July 8) (Weeramantry, J., dissenting).
126. I have argued elsewhere that one of the beliefs of the sixteenth century
jurist Francisco de Vitoria was that Christians may wage just wars whereas, it
seems, the Saracens are inherently incapable of engaging in just wars and therefore
incapable of sovereignty. See ANGHIE, supra note 119, at 26.




this lecture is influenced by this background, this tradition. However,
I would like to make a few comments that directly relate to this
tradition in the context of the theme of change in international law.
As I mentioned earlier, the TWAIL tradition began with the
attempt on the part of the new states, those that recently acquired
independence, to transform the system of international law and turn
it into one that reflected the aspirations and interests of the peoples of
the Third World. The term "Third World" is inherently problematic,
however successfully we might trace its origins. The usefulness of
the term has been questioned almost since its inception. Recent
events exacerbated this trend-the Global Financial Crisis and the
emergence of various "developing countries," such as China, India,
and Brazil, shifted the global distribution of power. It is unsurprising,
therefore, that at a conference I attended a few months ago, a scholar
from one of these emerging countries asserted that the term Third
World was now entirely obsolete. He proceeded to say that it was
now the Third World's turn to use the instruments of international
law to further its own progress.
Is a TWAIL analysis, then, one that is heavily influenced by the
history of imperialism, relevant in a world where the dichotomy
between the First World and the Third World (an inheritance,
largely, of that colonial history) is eroding in various ways? Will the
recent emergence of some Third World states lead to renewed
attempts to transform the international system, as was the great
ambition of the new states in the 1970s? Or will these emergent
Third World states now find that the existing rules operate in their
interests and, consequently, that the rules should be conserved and
deployed rather than changed. For instance, these emergent
developing states (or "EDS" to coin an acronym) are investors, rather
than the hosts of investments. Thus, if it can be said that the current
international law of investment, particularly as developed by arbitral
tribunals, is imbalanced and favors investors over host
governments-and this is a powerfully made argument by some
scholars-the question then arises as to whether these EDS would
really seek to change that law. More broadly and conceptually, these
questions return us to the fundamental point made in Gerry
Simpson's pioneering book: international law is a product of power
and operates in the interests of the powerful, and those who acquire
power would naturally seek to preserve and extend their power
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through law, rather than transform that law.128 I think then, that this is
an important issue that TWAIL must address. The developing states
in the 1970s possessed a compelling vision of a new international
system, which they articulated through numerous U.N. General
Assembly resolutions, such as the Charter on Economic Rights and
Duties Among States,129 but which they lacked the power to
implement. By contrast, it is arguable that now, that developing
states have relatively more power but lack the vision, program, and
unity of their predecessors in the 1970s. A number of complex
factors divide the states of the Third world.
In attempting to assess the relevance of TWAIL and the future of
TWAIL, let me then suggest some broad issues. The first regards
what some scholars termed, somewhat dramatically, the "Second
Scramble for Africa." A number of Asian and Middle Eastern
countries leased or bought large tracts of land in various African
countries in an attempt to ensure what might be termed food security.
Similarly, these countries secured concessions to the resources of
these African countries. Details about the legal aspects of these
arrangements remain obscure. Nevertheless, it can be argued that the
very term "scramble" is misleading and distorting to the extent that it
suggests that these events can be compared to the entirely
unconscionable European scramble for Africa that occurred in the
late nineteenth century and was furthered through massive violence
and conquest.13 0 After all, this recent engagement with Africa is
furthered through commerce. It is an engagement enabled through
128. See generally GERRY SIMPSON, GREAT POWERS AND OUTLAW STATES:
UNEQUAL SOVEREIGNS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (2004) (addressing
the power struggle between sovereign states, and suggesting that power
discrepancies exist between sovereign states and that the dominant states use
international law to justify and legalize this inequality).
129. See Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281
(XXIX), pmbl., U.N. Doc. A/RES/29/3281 (Dec.12, 1974) (promoting the
development of an international order based on sovereign equality,
interdependence, and cooperation among all states).
130. See generally ADAM HOCHSCHILD, KING LEOPOLD'S GHOST: A STORY OF
GREED, TERROR, AND HEROISM IN COLONIAL AMERICA (1998) (describing the
human rights movement that emerged to combat King Leopold II's brutal conquest
of the territory surrounding the Congo River in the 1880s); THOMAS PAKENHAM,
THE SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA: WHITE MAN'S CONQUEST OF THE DARK CONTINENT




negotiated agreements entered into by sovereign African states rather
than through the brutalities of conquest.
Against this, however, TWAIL scholarship asserted that a very
close relationship exists between commerce and conquest, and that
while commerce may often be seen as an alternative to conquest, it is
often complementary. In his recent important work, for instance,
James Gathii examined precisely this intricate and intimate
relationship between war and commerce."' Indeed, even in the first
scramble for Africa, some attempt was made to achieve the same
goals of acquiring access to the riches of Africa through the process
of commerce, rather than conquest. In the negotiations surrounding
the Berlin Conference that led to the division of Africa, an event that
still has tragically violent reverberations for the region, the U.S.
representative at the Conference, Mr. Kasson, argued that Western
states could acquire rights over African territories through treaty,
which involved recognizing the legal personality of African societies
and the capacity of Africans to dispose of themselves. Mr. Kasson's
suggestion was not accepted by the conference.13 2 The close
relationship between advocating that the natives had a right to
dispose of themselves and access to natural resources has proven to
be so resilient and powerful that even the resolution on Permanent
sovereignty over natural resources, which Third World states passed
in order to regain control of their natural resources, entrenches and
again asserts the rights of these people to dispose of their
resources.133
131. See generally JAMES THUO GATHII, WAR, COMMERCE, AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2010) (contending that commerce and war seem to depend
upon one another and refuting the traditional notion in international law that
commerce can insulate communities from war).
132. See M. F. LINDLEY, THE ACQUISITION AND GOVERNMENT OF BACKWARD
TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEING A TREATISE ON THE LAW AND
PRACTICE RELATING TO COLONIAL EXPANSION 33-34 (1926) (noting that the other
parties to the Berlin Conference hesitated to adopt a rule that would restrict their
methods of occupying African territory and require voluntary consent from the
African natives). This approach has its historical connections with the view that
treaties and consent provided the better way of acquiring sovereignty over
backward areas. See ANTHONY PAGDEN, LORDS OF ALL THE WORLD: IDEOLOGIES
OF EMPIRE IN SPAIN, BRITAIN AND FRANCE C.1500-c. 1800 80-86 (1995)
(explaining that the English and French believed legitimate claims to Native
American land could be achieved only through purchase).
133. See Permanent sovereignty over natural resources, G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII),
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The further point is that a focus on the mutual benefits of an
apparently free exchange between parties may obscure the violence
that is intensified through this process. Questions should arise as to
whose lands have been taken, who is being displaced, whether there
were alternatives, whether they consented to such actions. It is
clearly the case that the attempts of sovereign Third World states to
achieve development-and the whole question of African
concessions may be seen in this context-led to the displacement and
misery of thousands of tribal peoples and peasants whose fragile
livelihoods were dependent upon tenuous access to the land. For
many indigenous peoples, furthermore, the land is simply not a
commodity that can be bartered away. This reality needs to be
recognized. Imperialism has very often been furthered through the
ostensibly neutral and mutually beneficial process of expanding
commercial relations, as a study of the works of Vitoria and Vattel
reveals."I
The character and operation of the post-colonial state has been an
enduring concern of TWAIL scholars. One of the broad questions
that may be asked about the post-colonial state is the extent to which
it is, in fact, significantly different from the colonial state.
Generalizing broadly, the colonial state was constructed in a way to
enable the extraction of resources and the integration of the
colonized society into a system of political economy controlled by
the colonial power and operating in the interests of that power. It is
in this mediated and problematic way that the colonial entity was
integrated into the larger, global system as a subsidiary of the
metropolitan power. Another prominent feature of colonial authority
was the practice of divide and rule which was based on the crude but
often effective practice of dividing up local populations into different
ethnicities and then favoring one ethnic group-the minority
group-over the other, thus generating lingering and often violent
resentments. Multicultural communities that had interacted with each
other over many centuries and developed forms of interconnection,
mutual dependency, accommodation, and tolerance to enable them to
survive and prosper were now polarized by the decisive significance
U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., Supp. No.17, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (Dec. 14, 1962)
(recognizing the inalienable right of all states to freely dispose of their natural
wealth and resources in accordance with their own national interests).
134. See, e.g., ANGHIE, supra note 119, at 13-31, 269-70.
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given to one extremely problematic aspect of individual identity:
ethnicity.
The post-colonial state, of course, was supposedly committed to
reversing the effects of colonialism and operating in the interests of
the local people rather than the colonial ruler. And yet, some of the
fundamental features of the colonial state, a formidable apparatus of
power, were arguably maintained and deployed by indigenous elites
for their own purposes, even while they presented themselves as
representatives of the people. The colonial state intent on extraction
was replaced by the post-colonial state intent on development. In
many post-colonial states, furthermore, racial politics became a
prominent, and indeed defining, characteristic of the system of
elections and governance. Simply, once the modern state established
itself as having a monopoly of legitimate power over the entire
country, control over the state, naturally, became of paramount
importance. In democratic societies that were ethnically divided, the
temptation to use racial politics as a means of winning electoral
success was considerable, and often overwhelming. In cases such as
Rwanda, the racial politics that led to such disastrous consequences
were especially tragic because the ethnic categories used by the
protagonists, the Hutus and the Tutsis, were an invention of Belgian
colonial rule. Ironically and often tragically, then, unprincipled
leaders merely reproduced colonial categories to consolidate their
own power and exacerbate crippling divisions within their own
societies. In asserting their sovereignty, their right to self-
determination from colonial rule, through the politics of race, many
post-colonial states were instead tragically following a script written
for them by their colonial masters.
In these circumstances, the truly and radically anti-colonial policy
would have been to completely repudiate the racial politics that
colonial powers instantiated-for the great nationalist leaders of the
Third World to declare that the new states would not succumb to the
trap of ethnic politics that had been set by the colonial authorities and
would survive their departure and be an enduring source of conflict
and division, eventually justifying various forms of neo-colonial
intervention. Unfortunately, in many cases, this is not what occurred.
The leaders of many post-colonial states who have vociferously
proclaimed their nationalist credentials have inflicted enormous
suffering on their own people even while using themselves many of
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the techniques and technologies of colonial rule.
An extraordinarily powerful and perceptive book that deals with
the disappointments and failures of the post-colonial state is Dreams
from My Father: A Story of Race and Inheritance. I" Although it is
not usually read as a post-colonial text, it seems to me that President
Obama's father's own dreams and ambitions were focused on
serving the newly independent state of Kenya. These ambitions were
to be disappointed by the racial politics and authoritarian rule that
overwhelmed Kenya.
The role of the Third World or developing country states in
relation to the well-being and dignity of their own people is thus a
subject that requires ongoing analysis. Whatever the successes of
countries such as Brazil, Russia, India, and China ("BRIC"), it
should not be forgotten that the vast majority of developing
countries, particularly in Africa, continue to suffer great difficulties,
and that, even in the BRICs, large numbers of people remain in
poverty. This is also the case in relation to the plight of indigenous
peoples, both in developing countries and the West. As several
scholars pointed out, TWAIL scholarship has not adequately
engaged with the difficulties faced by these peoples, the objects of a
form of "internal colonialism" whose ways of life are often
threatened by development projects over which they have no
control. '3 Another area that demands close analysis is the plight of
displaced peoples, such as refugees and migrant workers.
135. BARACK OBAMA, DREAMS FROM MY FATHER: A STORY OF RACE AND
INHERITANCE (2004).
136. See, e.g., Gerardo J. Munarriz, Rhetoric and Reality: The World Bank
Development Policies, Mining Corporations, and Indigenous Communities in Latin
America, 10 INT'L CMTY. L. REV. 431, 432, 436 (2008) (arguing that the World
Bank's lending programs and legal framework have contributed to an expansion of
mining activities, which has directly contributed to the destruction of Indigenous
cultures and their environments); see also Prabhakar Singh, Indian International
Law: From a Colonized Apologist to a Subaltern Protagonist, 23 LEIDEN J. INT'L
L. 79, 95-96 (2010) (criticizing the exclusion of Indian aboriginal tribes from
notable TWAIL scholarship, particularly since certain tribal leaders played a large
role in fighting against British colonial rule, and remarking on the failure of the
Indian government to adequately protect these tribal peoples).
137. See, e.g., SATVINDER SINGH Juss, INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND
GLOBAL JUSTICE (2006); Ernesto Hernindez-L6pez, Sovereignty Migrates in U.S.
and Mexican Law: Transnational Influences in Plenary Power and Non-
Intervention, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1345 (2007).
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It is for all these reasons, then, that I believe that the work of
TWAIL scholars is indispensable to addressing and comprehending
these evolving complexities and shifting realities. It is especially
heartening to note here that a new generation of TWAIL scholars,
TWAIL III perhaps, has already made immense contributions to our
understanding of a variety of topics that have not previously been
analyzed from a TWAIL perspective.' 38 For all of us, however, the
dualities of TWAIL present an ongoing challenge. We are for Third
World sovereignty and yet also against it; sometimes for human
rights and sometimes critical of human rights;13 for international law
at times, and suspicious of it at others. The enduring riddle we
confront is how to formulate a position that is neither imperial, on
one hand, nor narrowly nationalistic on the other. Both imperialism
and the pathologies of the post-colonial state have caused immense
suffering to the peoples of the Third World. The challenge for
TWAIL is to articulate an alternative to these two very powerful
realities. This is the major issue that post-colonial scholarship
138. See, e.g., Mohsen Al Attar & Rosalie Miller, Towards an Emancipatory
International Law: The Bolivarian reconstruction, 31 THIRD WORLD Q. 347, 347-
63 (2010) (proposing that TWAIL scholars use the Bolivarian Alliance for the
Americas treaty to launch a movement to reform the international legal regime
away from a Eurocentric model).
139. See, e.g., Upendra Baxi, Voices of Suffering and the Future of Human
Rights, 8 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 126 (1998) (noting the
contradiction between the proliferation of human rights rhetoric during the
twentieth century with the simultaneous human rights atrocities and violations that
permeated throughout the century, including the Holocaust and post-Cold War
ethnic wars); Makau Mutua, Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of
Human Rights, 42 HARV. INT'L L.J. 201, 204-07 (2001) (criticizing the human
rights movement as Eurocentric and advocating for a new movement that
recognizes the moral equivalency of all cultures); Yash Ghai, Human Rights and
Social Development: Toward Democratization and Social Justice, U.N. RESEARCH
INST. FOR SOCIAL DEV. (Oct. 2001), http://www.unrisd.org/80256B3C005
BCCF9/(httpAuxPages)/ECDO417EBl 177C5280256B5E004BCAFA/$file/ghai.pd
f (presenting various criticisms of the notion that human rights are universal and
indivisible, such as claims that many societies and religions place importance on
duties rather than rights, that human rights cannot be universal because they vary
with each culture, and that many fundamentalists deny the equality of all human
beings). BALAKRISHNAN RAJAGOPAL, INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM BELOW
(Cambridge University Press 2003); Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Counter-hegemonic
International Law: Rethinking Human Rights and Development as a Third World
Strategy, 27 THIRD WORLD Q. 767 (2006); Vasuki Nesiah, The Specter of Violence
that Haunts the UDHR: The Turn to Ethics and Expertise, 24 MD. J. INT'L L. 135
(2009).
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attempted to address.
My broad concern, then, is that sovereignty is, perhaps somehow
inherently imperial. It always seeks to expand its reach and power,
whether internally or externally. Furthermore, given the growing
demand for limited resources-an issue that was recognized as a
central feature of international relations even by the earlier scholars,
such as Vattel and Grotius-the question arises as to whether some
form of economic imperialism can be avoided or, indeed, whether
imperialism itself is an inevitable aspect of international relations.
These questions particularly resonate in the light of the fact that for
many historians, empire has been the most enduring form of political
organization in human experience. Thus, scholars such as John
Darwin argue that it is the region of the land mass stretching from
the Pacific to the Middle East, an area that encompasses parts of
China, Russia, and India that historically exercised the most
influence over international affairs.140 For Darwin, the emergence of
India and China signal a return to that older order, significantly, that
older imperial order that was interrupted by five hundred years of
Western imperial expansion. If indeed the American Empire that
historians of international law such as Grewe and Schmitt concluded
their great works by examining is in decline, what will replace it?l41
Is it possible to imagine a non-imperial world?
7. CONCLUSION
These are confusing times. It is unclear as to which particular
paradigm or theoretical model may best capture this era and the
challenges it presents.14 2 Every period that experiences great change
140. See generally JOHN DARWIN, AFTER TAMERLANE: THE GLOBAL HISTORY
OF EMPIRE SINCE 1405 (2008).
141. See, e.g., WILHELM G. GREwE, THE EPOCHS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
(2000); SCHMITT, supra note 119.
142. See, e.g., JAN KLABBERS ET AL., THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2009) (constitutionalism); B.S.Chimni, Prolegomena to a
Class Approach to International Law, 21 EUR. J. INT'L L. 57 (2010) (class);
Benedict Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 15 (2005) (global administrative law); Onuma Yasuaki, A
Transcivilizational Perspective on International Law (Oct. 11, 2003) (Paper
submitted for Japanese Society of International Law symposium, "Unity in
Diversity: Asian Perspectives on International Law in the 21st Century"), available
at http://wwwsoc.nii.ac.jp/jsil/annualdocuments/2003/autumn/houkoku-
abstr/Panel%20A4%200numa%20paper.pdf (civilization); David Kennedy,
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and confusion raises the question: are we in a "Grotian moment"? Is
there any instruction or guidance that Grotius can offer us in this
time of change?
There are many aspects of the present that are undoubtedly novel
and unprecedented. And yet, there are many aspects of the present
that perhaps would be recognizable, to Grotius: religious wars;
fundamental questions of the meaning of just war, the rights of war
and peace, who can and cannot make war, the means of war, and the
tensions between competing empires; the sense of a new economic
order of unknown character struggling to emerge; the effort to
somehow comprehend the character of this new order and to account
for it coherently through sheer force of intelligence; and enduring
importance of the qualities of understanding and tolerance. As we
confront the Global Financial Crisis, let us not forget that Tulip
Mania, which resulted in a financial crisis that overwhelmed
Holland, occurred in the 1630 in the later part of Grotius's life-
although I'm not sure whether Grotius has written anything about
this.
But it is perhaps Grotius the person, rather than his writings and
teachings alone that may be of importance to us. This is the Grotius
who is not only the champion of a new system of international law,
but also the Grotius struggling to justify Dutch imperial expansion
and the rights of the quintessential multi-national corporation, the
Dutch East India Company. He played many roles, but he is more
human and accessible to us in this way, rather than as the Olympian
figure legislating for the world, the majestic founder of a new global
order. Perhaps it is better to see him in all his existential complexity
and doubt: leader, follower, and advocate of world peace, enabler of
massive violence, and conquest, poet, theologian, and scholar-a
brilliant and intensely ambitious individual continuously seeking
power and patronage. Further, Grotius was also a playwright. So
perhaps we could read Grotius less as a historical figure and more as
a drama, a text to be read and experienced in the way we read and
experience something like Hamletl4 3 or the Ramayana,144 or, given
Kormendy Lecture at Ohio Northern University, Pettit College of Law: The
Mystery of Global Governance (Jan. 25, 2008), available at
http://www.watsoninstitute.org/blss/media/docs/kennedy.pdf (global governance or
expert rule).
143. WELLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF HAMLET (1603).
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the significance of the Thirty Years' War for our discipline, Mother
Courage,14 5 finding new dimensions and insights into the issue of
what the vocation of international law involves as our own
experience changes.
Needless to say, these are simply my own impressions, my own
efforts to understand some of the puzzles and difficulties that we as
international lawyers confront in this 'time of change'. Buddhism
suggests that each of us must be the source of our own salvation. It is
a very individual and personal process and I wish you well in your
own journey. Thank You.
COMMENTARY ON 2010 GROTIUS LECTURE:
ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER
I do also, though, want to begin, actually, where Tony began-
remembering the generation that is passed and starting also with Tom
Frank. I really can't quite believe that this is an annual meeting
without Tom. For the longest time Tom was the annual meeting. He
was the life of the meeting. I remember him so clearly in his
extraordinary theater in the round performances where he managed
to assemble 10, 12, 14 distinguished government officials,
practitioners, professors, judges, and he would simply begin a
conversation and keep it going with wit and erudition and constant
insight. And his kindness and ability to befriend all, regardless of
ideology, politics, gender, nationality, race, ethnicity. He was a truly
global person. He embodied the ideals of the discipline that he
studied.
So, I also would dedicate these remarks to him. He was there at
the beginning of my career, and I really can't quite believe that he's
not still physically with us. He is very much with us in spirit. I also
wanted to pay tribute to Abe Chayes and to Ian Brownlie, whom we
also mourn this year. They were my second and third teachers of
International Law, respectively. I then worked with both of them on
the Nicaraguan Legal Team when Nicaragua sued the United
States. 14 6 It was my introduction to international legal practice. It is
144. VALMiKI, THE RAMAYAN (Ralph T. H. Griffith trans., 2000) (1895).
145. BERTOLT BRECHT, MOTHER COURAGE AND HER CHILDREN: A CHRONICLE
OF THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR (2006).
146. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
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hard to imagine two more different practitioners of international law
in just about every way. From the pace of their deliberation, to
their-I can remember many, many times, Abe hurrying Ian
Brownlie through a particular meal or a particular event to get on to
various things that we had to do. They were very different, and yet,
they both stood for two different spectrums of profound reverence
and love for international law.
Ian, as Tony, I think, put very well, never bothered with law and
politics or whether law was law. Law was law and he took it as such
and he explicated it as a body of independent and binding precedent
and principle. Abe, on the other hand, was always deeply wrapped up
in the intersection of law and politics. Indeed, Richard Falk assigned
Abe's book on the Cuban Missile Crisisl 47 to me as a senior in
college, and it is what decided me to go to law school and hopefully
to study with Abe, but to practice international law. And now, on a
daily basis in the State Department, where I often go down and look
at Abe's picture, happy to see that Harold Koh is the incumbent in
his office, but to think about how law shapes politics on a daily basis.
You can watch it happen in the State Department, happily, day to
day, in our meetings, and in our statements, but it's a very different
vision.
And yet it was Abe who said, on that team, that when Nicaragua
sued the United States and people asked why, as the legal advisor, he
had done so, he said, "There is nothing wrong with holding the
United States to its own [highest] standards."1 48 I pay tribute to both
of them. I think both of them saw international law as a way of
holding not just a country, but all of humanity to our own highest
standards. With that tribute to generations, I will comment. I couldn't
possibly comment on Tony's entire lecture. We would not have
dinner, and it's so rich. I think I'm going to pull out a couple of
specific themes and respond, and maybe raise a few more questions.
So, starting with the idea of a "Grotian moment," of a moment
when politics has sufficiently changed, a constant process, but there
U.S.), Merits, 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
147. ABRAM CHAYES, THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS (1974).
148. David E. Rosenbaum, Abram Chayes, John Kennedy Aide, Dies at 77, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 18, 2000, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2000/04/18/us/abram-
chayes-john-kennedy-aide-dies-at-77.html.
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are periods where we stand and recognize we are at a period of
particularly great change, the moments when that change crystallizes
into law. It is commonplace to recognize that the moment that gave
birth to Grotius's great works was a moment in which the greatest
causes of devastation and human suffering resulted from wars
between states, religious wars, primarily, or-as I think Tony points
out: "well ship-worn marauders"-attackers on private commerce.
This is, interestingly, a place we are again. I've spent quite a bit of
time on piracy in the last year, which I certainly did not expect.
But in that world, the veneration, or the upholding of state
sovereignty and state power was the best protection of the individual.
So, if you started from the perspective of a politics in which the wars
around you were the result of aggression or complete lawlessness,
then state power and absolute sovereignty-or as absolute as anyone
has ever been able to make it-was the greatest source of protection
for individuals. It strikes me that the project of sovereignty today is
quite different. It is still true, and Tony and I would agree-I told
you I'm afraid we're going to agree more than you might expect. It is
still absolutely true, in my view, that upholding sovereignty-the
basic sovereignty of states against other states-is an enormous
source of protection.
And we still see plenty of cases in which those traditional
protections, the protections in Article 2(4)149, are necessary. At the
same time, we are seeing, increasingly, the devastation and the
violence that comes within states, and indeed, in President Obama's
Nobel Prize lecture, as Tony quoted, President Obama said that wars
between states are "increasingly giv[ing] way to wars within
[them]."s 0 In that context, if we want to crystallize those politics in a
way, into law, in a way that protects individuals, absolute
sovereignty is the opposite of what we need. We need instead what
we call now, or what is evolving as, the "responsibility to protect"-
the protection of individuals against their government.
And it strikes me that our challenge, the challenge for this decade,
149. See U.N. Charter art. 2(4) (prohibiting states from threatening or utilizing
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state).
150. Barack Obama, President of the United States of America, Remarks by the
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for the next decade, is balancing those two-that we see those two
political realities and we have those two doctrines. One very well-
established, one very new and certainly not established as binding
law around the world, but nevertheless, I think, strengthening, and it
is getting that balance exactly right. That's where I think democracy
comes in. I won't disappoint Tony and talk about democracy, but
again, I will just say: (a) that my own views have evolved, and (b)
that I speak for an administration and agree with its position that
there is no desire to distinguish between democracies and non-
democracies as a matter of sovereignty or sovereign protection.
I agree with where Tony came out-that if we are talking about
conditions on sovereignty, democracy is a radically imperfect
concept and sufficiently difficult to define. You are wading into an
entire subjective thicket, but also, even if we could define it more
precisely, it is not the right way to condition sovereignty. But let me
turn to what President Obama said there and see if we can advance
the discussion a little bit. He did say that democracies do not go to
war with other democracies, but I think, more importantly, in his
Nobel Prize lecture, he said, "peace is unstable where citizens are
denied the right to speak freely or worship as they please; choose
their own leaders or assemble without fear.""' He also said, "Only
when Europe became free did it finally find peace."l52
That is not a claim about the moral superiority of the citizens in a
democracy. It is not about good versus evil. It is an instrumental
claim. It is a claim that says: where people are free to express
themselves, to assemble, to choose their own religions, to worship, to
associate with whom they please-in those states, those states will be
more stable, more secure, and less likely to attack their neighbors.
That is the claim. It is still, ultimately, an empirical claim. I think
you can find lots of support for it. I am not going to make claims that
it holds absolutely and we certainly know it holds of mature
democracies, not fledgling democracies. But I think it is important to
emphasize the instrumental nature of the claim as a statement about
what we aspire to do as a matter of politics and not as a matter of
law.
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absolves or, indeed, elevates the West. It is striking, Tony, that you
cited exactly the example I was going to cite, in terms of imperialist
fault for much of the violence we see within states. And I chose
Rwanda because I am half Belgian and feel a particular connection, a
very bad one there, and exactly as you said, the ways in which
imperialism has twisted society so that even in democratic forms, it
is much harder to reach the stability that President Obama was
talking about. But it is, I think, essential to recognize, particularly for
President Obama, for this entire administration, even for this country,
in many ways after recent experiences, that to talk about
democracy-even to promote or uphold democracy-is not a
statement about the moral superiority of one part of the world versus
another.
So, as I said, I conclude on that point where you did. I would agree
with Tom Frank, on a right of democratic governance. I would agree
that regional institutions certainly have the right. And I would argue
often, it is a benefit to condition membership on democracy, on
liberal democracy as the EU153 did, or to adopt declarations or
charters as the Organization of American States ("O.A.S.") has
done,154 something that played an important role when President
Zelaya was deposed in Honduras. The reaction of the United States,
the reaction of many countries, was informed by the democratic
charter of the O.A.S. This is further illustrated by the actions of the
African Union today in Madagascar, which is really quite
unprecedented-that a group of African states in a fellow state where
there has been a coup not only conditioned statements, but really
conditioned actions on what they perceived, they saw, as a violation
of the democratic process.
All of that, yes, but justifying intervention on the presence or
absence of democracy, the poor protection of sovereignty, no. So, let
me leave that on democracy and sovereignty, and talk just a little bit
about your very interesting discussion of regional contributions or
153. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, arts. 6(1), 49,
1997 O.J. (C 340) 145, (conditioning membership on adhering to the principles of
liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the
rule of law).
154. See Organization of American States Charter arts. 2(b), 3(d) (proclaiming
the promotion of representative democracy, while simultaneously upholding the
principle of nonintervention).
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civilization contributions to international law. And here, too, I think,
as in international relations, we are to take a much more multicultural
perspective. I think we could debate, I do not think we are
completely in a multi-polar world. I think we are in a world in which
power has defused quite dramatically, not only among states, but also
from states to non-state actors. But I would define a pure multi-polar
world as a world in which you not only have different centers of
power, but they are actively competing with one another.
Or they are competing and colluding and switching back and forth.
I don't see that. We are in a world of diffusion of power, but I would
stop short of calling it a multi-polar world. But it is certainly a world
in which different regions, different countries, are emerging and
contributing far more in the international system. Indeed, I would say
one of our great tasks, as we talk about sovereignty and the
responsibility to protect, is to implicate the very idea of
responsibility for solving international problems into the idea of what
it means to be a great power. That has to be part of the definition of
great power-it is not only the size of your military, the size of your
economy, the size of your population or territory, but your ability
and willingness to take responsibility to help solve collective
problems.
But different countries will do that in different ways and they will
bring their own ideas to the table in ways that I think are very
important. And, indeed, as somebody who has argued strongly, that
humility is a basic American value and something that certainly, I
think, this administration is trying to practice-we don't always
succeed. It is part of the value of humility to recognize how much
you can learn from other societies, from other cultures, and also from
taking responsibility for our part.
More broadly, in looking at what has worked around the world in
development practices, we should not only accept that we do not
know better, but we should actually learn from developing countries.
In this process, we come back to the perennial dilemma of
multiculturalism versus cultural relativism. And I will just put down
my marker. Many of you have heard me speak on this before. I think
it still comes down to what I call the concept of "legitimate
difference." That is, we welcome the contributions of multiple
civilizations, multiple countries, religions, legal traditions, but we
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still have to be prepared to draw absolute lines. I think of them as
"universal lines"-and I will just give you a couple of current
examples. Slavery is out of the question. So is trafficking in women
and girls and children-which might anyways be characterized as
female slavery or slavery of young people. I would say I would rule
those out, absolutely. Apartheid too, I would rule out regardless of
the culture; that is no longer acceptable.
I would probably go as far as to say, on balance, that the idea of
political prisoners is something that is similarly unacceptable. I
absolutely reject the idea that you can be imprisoned only because of
what you believe, because you fight, or because you disagree with a
power. I am not saying any of those would merit intervention, or that
others would not. But to give you a spectrum of what I still think, we
as lawyers have an obligation to try to draw those lines between
cultural differences and legitimate differences.
Finally, let me just talk a little bit about power and the different
nature of power. And, Tony, you raised this in your reflections on the
post-colonial state. There is still a great deal of power in the
international system and there will be as long as I can foresee of
power meaning dominion-that is, power over others, whether it is
power of individuals over other individuals, the power of states over
other states, the power to compel, or the power to coerce.
On the other hand, in many of our daily lives, certainly the lives of
those of you who are under thirty or under twenty-five, those of you
who live in a deeply connected and much more horizontal world,
there is far more discussion of "power with" than "power over." The
power of co-creation, the power of mass collaboration, the power of
diverse minds coming together and the ability then to solve problems
in ways we have never been able to do before. That is not a new
concept. The first time I ever heard it was in one of Lani Guinier's
books. But that basic notion of a power to make things happen, not
by dominion, but by connection and, as I said, co-creation, is a very
powerful force in our world. It is a very powerful force in corporate
management, in everything from Wikipedia, to modes of solving
development problems, collectively, to scientific research. It is the
source of systems thinking in much of the new science.
It is an extraordinarily difficult concept even to think about in
international law. If we are to think about crystallizing political
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reality, this is a reality that I see more and more on a daily basis from
television commercials to scientific texts. And yet, maybe it is
because I am now in government, I have lost the ability to expand
my theoretical imagination. I find it extraordinarily difficult to think
about how we would even express that kind of power, much less
crystallize it. You might say that something like the G-20 versus the
U.N. expresses some notion of it. In the G-20, obviously, nobody has
any formal power over anyone else. It is not even a consensus
organization. It does not have formal decision making rules. It is a
horizontal group. Its source of power is the ability to solve problems
and, indeed, none other than Leslie Gelb, who is a typically realist
international relations practitioner, writes that the source of
leadership in the twenty-first century is the ability to solve
problems.' So, that captures something of this horizontal idea and
the source of power. But how to then think about how it relates to
more formal vertical sources of power, how to capture it, how to
harness it in our own discipline, I think I will leave that to you. I
think you should be able to get it done in the next three to four days.
I also want to end by paying tribute to "Third World approaches to
international law." To TWAIL, as I still call it. But in a different way
than Tony did. And I want to come back to where I started on
generational passing.
The international lawyers we paid tribute to, Sir Ian, Abe Chayes,
Tom Frank, and many others, were wonderful international lawyers.
They were also male and white and Western. That was not their fault.
It is not a fault, but as I look out on generational passing, I am ever
more struck, and I said this last year as well, but it strikes me every
time I stand up at a podium in the American Society of International
Law and I look out on an audience that is no longer even majority
white and male and Western. That is in no small part, due to TWAIL,
to the efforts of the many faculty members and younger scholars and
mentors who have opened our doors so that if we are not completely
global, we are much more so. And that, at the risk of being guilty,
and Tony will know of what I speak, of a liberal progressive
narrative, is to me a positive tribute to changing generations in
international law. Thank you.
155. LESLIE H. GELB, POWER RULES: How COMMON SENSE CAN RESCUE
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (2009).
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